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Interpreting the Constitution’s Elegant
Specificities
STEVEN SEMERARO†
Chief Justice Roberts coined the phrase “elegant
specificit[ies]” to describe the constitutional clauses
regulating how different parts of the government interact.1
In contrast to the founding document’s individual rights-

† Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I would like to thank my
colleague, Professor Bryan H. Wildenthal, whose editorial on the recess
appointment case served as an impetus for this Article, and Professor Michael
Ramsey who encouraged Prof. Wildenthal and I to debate the role of originalism
in that case on The Originalism Blog. See Steven Semeraro, The Truth About the
Supreme Court’s Recess-Appointments Ruling: Concluding Thoughts in Response
to Professor Wildenthal, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Aug. 8, 2014, 10:50 AM),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2014/08/a-response-onoriginalism-and-recess-appointmentssteven-semeraro.html. The exchange can
also be found on SSRN. Bryan H. Wildenthal & Steven Semeraro, The Truth
About the Supreme Court’s Recess-Appointments Ruling: A Debate (Thomas
Jefferson
Sch.
of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
2538257,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538257. I also thank
Professor Lawrence Solum for being a scholar’s scholar and introducing me to
semantic originalism, recommending an early draft of this paper on his Legal
Philosophy Blog, and discussing the paper with me at the 2016 University of San
Diego Originalism Conference. I am particularly indebted to Chris Guzelian who
provided detailed feedback on an earlier draft that has proven extremely helpful.
I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Thomas Jefferson School of
Law, and the questions and feedback from the participants in that session—
particularly from Ilene Durst and Anders Kaye—played a significant role in
shaping the final paper. I also thank Jenny Burns for her excellent research
assistance.
1. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2678, 2690 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Elections
Clause). The Elections Clause states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 4, cl. 1.
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defining “majestic generalities,”2 commentators have long
assumed that courts could easily apply the specific intragovernmental commands in accordance with their plain,
original meanings.3 In recent terms, however, the Supreme
Court has split bitterly when interpreting ostensibly clear
language in both the Elections Clause4 and the Recess
Appointments Clause.5 Although the justices oriented
toward an originalist interpretive method found the clauses
clear,6 the Court’s living constitutionalists carried the day,
pointing to potential vagueness and ambiguities. The lack of
an interpretive method for the elegantly specific clauses led
to disengaged conflict with no hint of common ground
between the competing camps.
Proposing a new interpretive method—farsighted
originalism—this Article bridges the divide. Like the best
methods developed to interpret the individual rightsdefining clauses,7 this one accommodates both of the core
commitments of American constitutionalism: (1) that we are
governed by a rule of law, not men; and (2) that We the
2. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); see KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 197 (1999) (The living
constitutionalism since the Warren Court era has involved judges
“exploit[ing] . . . the text’s ‘vague’ phrases to alter inherited meaning. . . . The
Constitution is made to ‘grow’ by providing these broad terms with meaning
drawn from contemporary sensibilities.”).
3. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 230 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]
(“[H]ardwired rules normally will be applied the same way over time.”); JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM];
Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM 1, 21–22 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) (“It
is true that some provisions of the Constitution have a determinate original
meaning . . . .”).
4. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(interpreting the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1).
5. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014) (interpreting the Recess
Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3).
6. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2679–85 (Roberts, J., dissenting);
Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2598.
7. See infra Section I.A.
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People through self-governance continually seek a more
perfect union.8
Farsighted originalism analogizes the original meaning
of the Constitution’s elegant specificities to—wait for it—a
quantum particle in superposition.9 Perhaps surprisingly,
this non-legal term communicates more effectively a point
that is difficult to make with standard legal language. A
particle in superposition simultaneously occupies all possible
states in which it might be found until an outside influence
triggers its decoherence into a single one. This concept differs
fundamentally from ordinary ways of perceiving what
appears to be a fixed material reality.10 But it nonetheless
describes that reality more accurately than our sensory
methods. As physicist Sean Carroll put it, the concept of
superposition in particle physics renders “what we can
observe about the world . . . only a tiny subset of what

8. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 237 (“[T]he
text of the Constitution begins with the declaration that ‘We the People . . . do
ordain and establish this Constitution . . . .’ The text is a powerful representation
of the commitments that successive generations claim to share and that bind
them together as a people; it symbolizes the continuity of America’s constitutional
story.”); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 339–40 (1996) (concluding that the Constitution has a
“duality of meaning”); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1501
(1988) (“Each of the two constitutionalist formulas—self-government and a
government of laws—seems to express a demand that we are all bound to respect
as a primal requirement of political freedom: the first demands the people’s
determination for themselves of the norms that are to govern their social life,
while the second demands the people’s protection against abuse by arbitrary
power.”); see also BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 3 (“[T]he choice
[between living constitutionalism and originalism] is a false one. Properly
understood, these two views of the Constitution are compatible rather than
opposed.”); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption
427,
428
(Yale
Law
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
140,
2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987060&download=yes
(“[T]he choice between originalism and living constitutionalism is a false one,
and . . . I regard myself both as an originalist and as a living constitutionalist.”).
9. See SEAN CARROLL, FROM ETERNITY TO HERE: THE QUEST
ULTIMATE THEORY OF TIME 228–53 (Penguin Grp. 2010) (1966).
10. Id. at 229.
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actually exists.”11 Just as we normally perceive matter to
have a single state, we perceive a legal text to have a single
meaning. But that perception can be incomplete, particularly
with constitutional language that often emerges from openended strategic agreement rather than cooperative
resolution.
Farsighted
originalism
recognizes
that
the
Constitution’s elegantly specific clauses embody more than
the semantic meaning of the words. Those clauses convey a
rubric designed to respond to a particular problem arising
from the interaction between different branches or levels of
government. This rubric creates a superposition of potential
original public meanings, all of which would have rung true
for the founding generation as methods to resolve disputes of
both well-known and then-unforeseen origins.12 The
meaning conveyed by this problem-solving rubric is broader
than the semantic meaning of the text, but it is nonetheless
fixed and constrained by that text.
For example, applying farsighted originalism to
interpret the Elections Clause phrase “the legislature of the
state thereof” would require a judge to explore how the
framers’ chosen words addressed a then-contemporary
problem. Although the 1789 semantic meaning of the phrase
was almost certainly “a representative body,”13 the rubric
could be broad enough to encompass a citizens’ initiative as
well. The answer would turn on the nature of the problem
that the founding generation addressed through the clause
and the rubric used to solve it. Farsighted originalism
respects an original meaning while acknowledging the full
potential range—that is, the superposition—of the original
problem-solving rubric.
An originalist critic may contend that the proposed
method is not true originalism and suffers from the same
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. See infra Section III.C.
13. See infra Section II.B.
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flaw as living constitutionalism—that modern judges may
insert their own subjective values into the Constitution. To
be sure, farsighted originalism focuses on the meaning at the
time of adoption. But critics may argue that its core is not
sufficiently hard, because the method permits the modern
judge to choose among the meanings within the
superposition of original public meanings. It thus opens the
door—in a way similar to investigations into the clause’s
purpose—to modern, rather than original, meaning.
This critique rests on the contestable assumption that a
coherent fixed semantic meaning exists independently from
the use to which the drafters directed the text. To make that
claim, however, one must commit to a realm of discoverable,
inter-personal and thus ultimately uncontestable historic
facts that is distinct from a realm of subjective,
individuating, and inherently contestable values. A
definitive original meaning—a semantic originalist must
believe—can be discovered from the words of the
Constitution alone without reference to the subjective
values—the whims and desires—embodied in any particular
application of a constitutional clause to a specific situation.
But this division between a semantic meaning resting on
inter-subjective, incontestable facts and applicative
meanings driven by subjective values may be an artificial
one. Significant scholarly work contends that what we
perceive as incontestable facts actually depends on a shared
value structure from which the language used to convey
those facts emerged.14 If this view is correct, fact and value
cannot be meaningfully separated in the way that semantic
originalism requires. The functional understanding of intragovernmental regulatory clauses that farsighted originalism
provides may thus most accurately convey an original public
meaning from which courts can interpret the Constitution’s
elegant specificities.
Part I reviews the originalist/living constitutionalist
14. See infra Section V.C.
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framework that the Court has used to interpret specific
constitutional clauses mediating conflict between branches
of government or different sovereigns. It shows that scholars
have developed various methods to interpret the
Constitution’s
individual
rights-defining
majestic
generalities that accommodate American constitutionalism’s
commitments to both original meaning via the rule of law
and living constitutionalism via the self-governance
commitment.15 By contrast, those same scholars write as if
the elegantly specific clauses essentially interpret
themselves because they have clear, non-contestable plain
meanings. No accommodative methods exist for the elegant
specificities. Part II shows that despite the ostensive clarity
of the Constitution’s intra-governmental-conflict-resolving
clauses, the Court has struggled to interpret them. These
recent cases reveal that the intra-governmental regulatory
clauses evoke disagreements no less spirited than those in
individual rights-defining cases. Part III proposes farsighted
originalism and the superposition of original public
meanings as an interpretive method for the specific intragovernment-conflict-resolving clauses and explains how to
apply this new method. Using the Court’s recent cases as
examples, it produces critically different results and
rationales. Part IV responds to the critique that the proposed
method insufficiently constrains the courts. It raises the
possibility that linguistic meaning cannot exist as a matter
of incontestable historic fact in isolation from how the values
embedded in the words are applied to specific circumstances.
Value choices may thus be inherent in the nature of language
and thus a necessary part of what it means to interpret the
Constitution to conform to an original public meaning.
I. DIFFERING INTERPRETIVE METHODS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES
The Constitution includes at least two types of clauses:

15. See infra Section I.A.
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(1) those that define individual rights with respect to the
government; and (2) those that mediate the interaction
among branches and levels of government. For nearly a half
century, scholars and judges have waged a familiar debate
over whether courts should interpret the Constitution to (1)
track its original meaning—originalism—or (2) evolve in
response to social development—living constitutionalism.
This Part explains that while a rich body of scholarship
bridges originalist and living constitutionalist thinking when
interpreting the Constitution’s rights-defining majestic
generalities, no similarly dualistic method has emerged for
the specific intra-governmental regulatory clauses.16 This
paucity of theory hinders the courts’ ability in practice to
interpret the Constitution’s elegant specificities.
A. Living Constitutionalism as an Accommodative
Interpretive Method
Charles Reich defined living constitutionalism as
embodying the re-evaluative, self-governance commitment
16. Although the concept of differing interpretive methods for different
clauses may initially strike a dissonant chord, the scholarship cited in this Part
shows that different interpretative methods have been presumed to apply to
different types of constitutional clauses. Distinguishing between rights-defining
and intra-governmental-dispute resolving clauses also has a strong grounding in
constitutional history. The notion that interpretive methods may differ between
these two types of clauses dates back to Chief Justice Marshall’s seminal early
decisions. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 703 (1975). As Grey has explained, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174–
75 (1803)—the foundation of the originalist approach to judicial review—was a
case about an intra-governmental conflict: could Congress expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? Grey, supra, at 707. Grey described this issue
as a “technical and explicit constitutional provision . . . .” Id. Chief Justice
Marshall justified judicial review as a necessary means to enforce original
meaning, a judicial responsibility “essential to all written constitutions . . . .”
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180. But this text-focused, originalist approach stood in sharp
contrast to the early Court’s grapplings with individual rights. In the latter, the
justices looked beyond the text’s original meaning and incorporated into its
interpretive method “general principles which are common to our free
institutions” but that had no specific textual basis. Grey, supra, at 708 (quoting
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810)); see also Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143
(Johnson, J., concurring in part) (agreeing only with the reliance on “general
principles”).
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within American legal culture: “There is no such thing as a
constitutional provision with a static meaning.”17 To
“maintain its integrity,” a constitutional clause must move
“in the same direction and at the same rate as the rest of
society.”18 Critics deride living constitutionalism as
empowering modern judges to interpret the Constitution to
require what “would be desirable in modern circumstances”
regardless of original meaning19 or worse yet
“what . . . judges want [the Constitution’s words] to mean
today[.]”20

17. Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 673, 735 (1963).
18. Id. at 736. In the recent gay marriage decision, the Court described the
process in these terms:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom
in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s
central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must
be addressed.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“History and tradition guide
and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. . . . That method
respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present.”); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–44
(1934) (Hughes, J.) (“[T]he great clauses of the Constitution must [not] be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have placed upon them . . . .” Interpretations must
demonstrate “a growing recognition of public needs . . . .”).
19. Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing
From the Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 889, 893–94 (2015) (“[P]urpose arguments are not a way of
determining what the constitutional enactors were passing, but instead are
largely a way of viewing the Clause as intended to do what judges or other
modern government officials believe would be desirable in modern circumstances.
In other words, purpose comes very close to being a method of engaging in living
constitutionalism.” (emphasis added)).
20. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 105 (2004); see
also WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 197; William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976) (Judges advancing living
constitutionalism are simply “a small group of fortunately situated people with a
roving commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and
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But some living constitutionalists have recognized a
place for originalism, insisting that the constitutional text
must “maintain its integrity.”21 Justice Brennan, for
example, acknowledged the relevance of “the history of the
time of framing,”22 emphasizing that judges must “respect
[the framer’s] fundamental choices and adopt them as their
own guide to evaluating quite different historical
practices.”23 He contended that a living constitutionalist
remained “faithful to the content of the Constitution . . . [by]
interpreting the text [to] account for the existence of . . .
substantive value choices and . . . accept the ambiguity
inherent in the effort to apply them to modern
circumstances.”24
Ronald Dworkin, a living constitutionalist, articulated a
theory for interpreting the Constitution’s broad provisions
that would follow the original meaning of a concept—like the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments—but not the
specific conceptions that the founding generation held.25

federal administrative officers concerning what is best for the country.”); Michael
B. Rappaport, Neither Originalism nor Nonoriginalism Allows a Broad Recess
Appointments Power, CONST. DAILY (Jan. 14, 2014), http://blog.
constitutioncenter.org/2014/01/neither-originalism-nor-nonoriginalism-allows-abroad-recess-appointments-power/ (Living constitutionalism grants judges “the
power to update [the Constitution’s] provisions to take into account modern
values and circumstances.”).
21. Reich, supra note 17, at 735–36; see Balkin, supra note 8, at 452–54.
22. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
23. Id. at 437.
24. Id.
25. Ronald Dworkin has articulated a method of interpretation through which
broad concepts are drawn from the original understanding of the Constitution
while particular conceptions of those concepts are derived through a living
constitutionalist method. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131–49
(1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; see also RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 48–49, 119–45 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–38, 259–60 (1986)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]. Dworkin’s method is used here for ease of
exposition and is not intended as an endorsement of it as the best way to deal
with interpretive questions flowing from the Constitution’s majestic generalities.
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Modern courts could select the conceptions that fit best with
modern understandings while remaining faithful to the fixed
original concepts.26
Similarly, Jack Balkin has argued explicitly that a living
constitutionalist must follow the original meaning of the
Constitution’s “framework” of rules, standards, and
principles. “Fidelity to the Constitution,” Balkin contends,
“requires us to build out constitutional constructions that
best apply the text and its associated rules, standards, and
principles to our current circumstances.”27 Living
constitutionalism, he thus argued, more faithfully applies
the original meaning of the text than following the specific
expectations of the founding generation.28
The appeal of living constitutionalism is confirmed by
the enshrinement within our constitutional framework of
many prohibitions and practices that would have no place in
a constitutional lexicon that hued to a more restrictive
original understanding of the Constitution’s text.29
B. Originalism as an Accommodative Interpretive Method
Despite living constitutionalism’s many successes,
virtually no one—and certainly no justice of the Court—
claims to reject the relevance of the Constitution’s original
meaning.30 In Jack Rakove’s words, the necessity of

26. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 134–36;
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 25, at 48–49, 119–45; DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 228–38, 259–60.
27. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 229.
28. See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 228–29;
Balkin, supra note 8, at 452–54.
29. Such decisions include those dealing with racial segregation, inter-racial
marriage, the equal protection clause as applied to women and the federal
government, and the one-person-one-vote rule. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 510.
30. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 199 (“No advocate of living
constitutionalism seems willing to embrace the complete rejection of intentions
from constitutional interpretation, yet such a rejection would appear to be
required by the theory.”).
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originalism in legal analysis “seems so general that citation
is almost beside the point.”31 “Any lawyer knows,” James
Gardner has pointed out, “the use of originalist vocabulary is
simply obligatory for participants in the legal system.”32
The persistent appeal of originalism rests in our
commitment to being governed by laws, not men.33 By
adhering to a written text as opposed to a general
understanding of principles as the charter of government,34
we concede the importance of the Constitution’s original
meaning. However, this is not because the founders were
especially worthy of deference. Rather, their choice to adopt
a written constitution embodies our ideal of government by
law and thus demands recurrence to the meaning of a fixed
text that constrains our decisions today.35
Originalism’s central claim, Lawrence Solum has
explained, “is that constitutional law includes rules with
content that are fixed by the original public meaning of the

31. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1587, 1592 n.14 (1997); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 33,
139 (Univ. of Ill. College of Law, Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Research Paper
Series No. 07–24, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (“[T]he idea
that the meaning (semantic content) of the [C]onstitution contributes in an
important way to the content of constitutional law—that’s not controversial
among judges, officials, and lawyers.”).
32. James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account
and Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991).
33. The phrase “a government of law, not men” likely has roots in the
Seventeenth Century, but was connected in the context of American
Constitutionalism most directly with John Adams. Respectfully Quoted: A
Dictionary of Quotations, BARTLEBY.COM, http://www.bartleby.com/73/991.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017); see HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 182 (1965)
(“[T]he men of the Revolution . . . prided themselves on founding republics, that
is, governments ‘of law and not of men.’”). The benefits of upholding a Rule of
Law are widely accepted and include “predictability, fairness, nonretroactivity,
coordination, and the restraint of arbitrary power.” BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM,
supra note 3, at 39; see also Solum, supra note 3, at 62.
34. The decision to rely on a written constitution contrasts with the British
system that rested on “a tradition of practice, general understandings, and
occasional declarations.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 50–53.
35. See id. at 53.

558

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

text—the conventional semantic meaning of the words and
phrases in context.”36 Modern originalists thus do not look to
the intent of the Constitution’s drafters.37 They believe that
the text itself conveys a discoverable public meaning38 that
is distinct from the framers’ unknowable psyches.39 “As

36. Solum, supra note 31, at 2; see also BARNETT, supra note 20, at 93–94 n.21
(Barnett quotes Dworkin defining semantic originalism as “what did those who
wrote the Constitution mean to say in it.”).
37. The idea for semantic originalism may have arisen with Justice Scalia’s
speech urging originalists to move from the concept of intent to the concept of
meaning. Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987); see also Solum, supra note 31, at 14–18. See
generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599 (2004). A key element of semantic originalism is the distinction between
constitutional interpretation, which involves uncovering the original public
meaning of the words of the document, and constitutional construction, which
involves answering constitutional questions by applying the full array of legal
and policy devices to reach a decision that does not conflict with the original
public meaning. BARNETT, supra note 20, at 118–30; WHITTINGTON, supra note 2,
at 7–10; Solum, supra note 31, at 19, 63–84.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, Robert Bork and others argued that the
original intent of those who drafted the Constitution should constrain courts.
Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 2,
32 (1981) (“[T]he Court is imposing its own values on the people, often in defiance
of the framers’ intentions. . . . [T]he Court is not empowered to reverse the
unmistakable intention of the Framers.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (1971) (“The words are
general but surely that would not permit us to escape the framers’ intent if it
were clear.”); see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973); Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the
Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 254 (1972); Edwin Meese III, Speech Before
the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1986).
See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (critiquing the
Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment to effectively amend the Constitution
in ways that disregarded the original intent of the founding fathers as well as
Congress ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment).
38. Public meaning for new originalists meant the linguistic meaning of the
words, not the purpose to which the drafters thought the words would be put—
the teleological meaning—nor how the words would apply—the applicative
meaning. Solum, supra note 31, at 2–3, 11.
39. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 221 (1980) (arguing that the drafters’ intent could never be
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individuals,” Keith Whittington explained, “the founders
were capable of agreeing to a common text with a commonly
understood meaning, and it is this meaning that the
originalist hopes to uncover.”40 Justice Scalia put it this way,
“[w]e look for a sort of ‘objectified intent’—the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris. . . . It is
determined by modern judges because no unified intent existed and even
individual drafters would not have formed intentions sufficient to resolve modern
questions). Brest evocatively described the task as “the counterfactual and
imaginary act of projecting the adopters’ concepts and attitudes into a future they
probably could not have envisioned.” Id. at 221. He concluded that the product of
this projection would be “a fantasy world more of [the interpreter’s] own than of
the adopters’ making.” Id.; see Brennan, supra note 22, at 435. The original intent
is “a view that feigns self-effacing deference to the specific judgments of those
who forged our original social compact. Id. But in truth it is little more than
arrogance cloaked as humility.” A judge cannot “gauge accurately the intent of
the Framers on application of principle to specific, contemporary questions.” Id.
Worse still, Brest asked, why modern society would want to empower the
framers to constrain us given their wildly undemocratic processes; they were,
after all, exclusively property-owning white men who believed that neither
women nor blacks should participate in political decision-making. See BARNETT,
supra note 20, at 115 (recognizing that the framers were all white men and the
process thus excluded a large segment of the population); Brest, supra, at 229–
30 (“Besides the methodological and historiographic difficulties of this enterprise,
it is prey to a normative problem: The drafting, adopting, or amending of the
Constitution may itself have suffered from defects of democratic process which
detract from its moral claims.”). “To take an obvious example, the interests of
black Americans were not adequately represented in the adoption of the
Constitution of 1787 or the fourteenth amendment.” Id.
Others scholars offered different critiques of original intent. Grey, supra
note 16, at 712–13 (claiming that scope of the Constitution was not intended to
be limited to specific language); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1984) (arguing that the specific words in the
Constitution play only a limited role in the Supreme Court’s review of the law);
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 888, 903 (1985) (The “original ‘original intent’ was determined not by
historical inquiry into the expectations of the individuals involved in framing and
ratifying the Constitution, but by consideration of what rights and powers
sovereign polities could delegate to a common agent without destroying their own
essential autonomy. Thus, the original intentionalism was in fact a form of
structural interpretation.”). Furthermore, the “framers’ primary expectation
regarding constitutional interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other
legal document, would be interpreted in accord with its express language.” Id.
40. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 164.
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the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”41
Historical research into sources ranging from thencontemporary dictionaries to uses and courses of conduct,
originalists believe, conveys this original understanding.42
Critics, of course, argue that originalists would enable

41. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997) (emphasis in original).
Potential non-rule-of-law justifications for originalism have been largely
disowned by leading advocates of this method. For example, originalism might be
thought to foster more clarity and precision than living constitutionalism. But
Whittington has explained that this is not so: “[A]n originalist judge is faced with
many of the same difficulties and temptations that are faced by non-originalist
judges . . . . [Originalism] cannot be expected to free judges from the exercise of
contestable interpretive judgment.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 4; see also
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2007). This is true both because meaning is often
contested and when clear may still be vague and incapable of providing a
definitive answer to a particular constitutional question. See WHITTINGTON,
supra note 2, at 9–10.
Similarly, originalism does not necessarily foster judicial restraint.
Although original intent scholars made this claim, new originalists generally
reject it. See id. at 42–43; BARNETT, supra note 20, at 266–67. “As is clear from
both the text and history,” Whittington explained, “the founders were not pure
majoritarians but were also interested in limiting government. . . . [A] philosophy
of restraint . . . may not be consistent with advocacy of originalism per se.”
WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 44. New originalists thus acknowledge that
“courts do have a special role within the constitutional system” and must enforce
not just the clear meaning of the text but the “gaps as well . . . .” Id. at 40–41, 44
(explaining that originalism cannot be justified on the ground that courts are not
adequate to decide policy issues or that originalism is uniquely constraining);
BARNETT, supra note 20, at 266 (“A reliance on judges . . . is unavoidable in a
constitutional system in which only courts are available to stand between
individual citizens and majority and minority factions operating through
representative government.”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra, at 383
(acknowledging that the Constitution empowers the courts to overturn legislation
and block other government action that either (1) conflicts with the original
public meaning of the Constitution; or (2) applies vague, undetermined
constitutional text consistently with that meaning).
42. BARNETT, supra note 20, at 93 (Originalism’s sources are “dictionaries,
common contemporary meanings, an analysis of how particular words and
phrases are used elsewhere in the document or in other foundational documents
and cases, and logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the
text.”).
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the dead hand of an unenlightened and undemocratic past to
dictate modern law.43 But just as living constitutionalism
accommodates original meaning, originalism recognizes that
a modern court might legitimately reject a clear original
meaning for “overriding reasons of morality.”44 Beyond this
presumably rare situation, originalists recognize the concept
of constitutional implicature.45 That is, situations in which
the Constitution does not specifically address a particular
concept, but the text—given the document’s structure—
implies it.46 To the extent that the Constitution implies an
unenumerated right—such as one-man one-vote—
originalism could accommodate it.
More generally, originalism distinguishes between
constitutional
interpretation
and
constitutional
47
construction. The former draws a specific meaning directly

43. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1072–73 (1988); Brest, supra note 39,
at 225 (“We did not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and
gone.”).
44. Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a
Reply to Professor Griffin 22 (Univ. of Ill. College of Law, Ill. Pub. L. & Legal
Theory, Research Paper Series No. 08–12, 2008).
45. Id. at 5, 12 (“[T]he constitution may mean things it does not explicitly
say,” and “if there are instances of necessary constitutional implicature, then
those instances are part of the meaning of the Constitution and they should be
understood as within the ‘theory of clause meaning.’”).
46. Id. at 12.
47. Solum, supra note 31, at 19 (“This distinction [between interpretation and
construction] explicitly acknowledges what we might call the fact of
constitutional underdeterminacy. With this turn, original-meaning originalist[s]
explicitly embrace the idea that the original public meaning of the text ‘runs out’
and hence that constitutional interpretation must be supplemented by
constitutional construction, the results of which must be guided by something
other than the semantic content of the constitutional text.” (emphasis removed));
see WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 7, 10. In distinguishing the interpretation of
constitutional meaning from constitutional construction, one must distinguish
ambiguity—which can generally be resolved through interpretation—from
vagueness that is inherent in meaning.
A word is ambiguous if it has more than one meaning and it is unclear
which meaning is intended. Does the right to keep and bear “arms,” for
example, refer to weapons or to human limbs? . . . In contrast, vagueness
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from the words and thus “has a limited reach.”48 But the
latter ascribes meaning “after all judgments have been
rendered specifying discoverable meaning . . .” and the
correct application of the clause in question remains vague.49
In this so-called construction zone, an interpreter employs
“normative principles or powers to the document that were
neither envisioned by its adopters nor contrary to their
intentions, as demonstrated by the language and structure of
the document as originally understood.”50 Going beyond
semantic meaning—because it has run out—a judge may
determine how constitutional law will operate in a particular
case within the scope of the vagueness embodied in the
Constitution’s text.51 This constitutional construction “bears
a more tenuous and alloyed connection with the text but as
a result can extend constitutional meaning even further
before it too exhausts the possibility of the existing text.”52
Solum, perhaps the leading explicator of modern
originalism, has recognized the potential for accommodating
originalism with living constitutionalism. Modern
originalism, he has explained, “acknowledges the fact that
the text contains a number of provisions that are written in
abstract, general, and vague language—with the

is the problem of applying a term to a marginal object. Such weapons as
guns and knives are clearly included in the term “arms.” How about long
heavy flashlights of the sort carried by the police?
BARNETT, supra note 20, at 119; see also Solum, supra note 31, at 2. And
importantly, vagueness is not the result of uncertain meaning but is
encapsulated within the meaning itself. For example, Solum uses tall as an
example of a vague term because the precise point at which something transforms
from short to tall is not encompassed within the meaning of the term. Id. at 70.
48. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 10.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1264–65 (1987)
(emphasis in original); see also Barnett, supra note 20, at 123–24; Solum, supra
note 31, at 18–19; WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 7–10.
51. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 2.
52. Id. at 10.
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consequence that their application to particular cases will
require construction.”53 Originalists “can endorse the
adaptation of constitutional doctrine to changing
circumstances and values—even while they insist that the
construction zone in which this evolution occurs is bounded
by the fixed linguistic meaning of the constitutional text
(unless truly extraordinary circumstances obtain).”54 This
method, he recognizes, may be compatible with a living
constitutionalism that properly respects the original
meaning of non-vague constitutional language.55
Leading adherents to each interpretive method—though
certainly not all—acknowledge this accommodative
potential.56 The living constitutionalist Paul Brest, for
example, believed that courts must “take[] account of the text
and original understanding . . . .”57 And Keith Whittington,
a pioneer of modern originalism, articulated a method of
constitutional construction that applied the full array of legal
and policy devices to reach a decision that does not conflict
with the original meaning.58 Jack Balkin has gone the

53. Lawrence B. Solum, Living with Originalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM 143, 154 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011); see
also Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism, supra note 44, at 36.
54. Solum, Living with Originalism, supra note 53, at 154–55; see also Solum,
supra note 44, at 36.
55. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism, supra note 44, at 36–
37.
56. The point made in the text is that scholars addressing the Constitution’s
individual rights-defining majestic generalities have articulated accommodative
methods that have a wide swath of support. To be sure, some adherents to both
living constitutionalism and originalism seek to limit or deny the potential for
accommodation. Although its desirability remains subject to debate, it has been
articulated and is available to courts. Within the realm of the more specific intragovernmental regulatory clauses, no similar accommodative methods have been
articulated.
57. Brest, supra note 39, at 224.
58. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 7–10. Leading originalists may differ
from Whittington in the details, but all recognize the interpretation/construction
dichotomy. See BARNETT, supra note 20, at 118–30; Solum, supra note 31, at 19,
63–84.
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furthest
in
overtly
synthesizing
American
constitutionalism’s dual commitments through his theory of
living originalism,59 and one can find similar—albeit less
overt—unifying
approaches
from
many
leading
60
constitutional scholars. All of this work, however, has

59. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 433 (explaining that the original meaning of
constitutional clauses is embodied in a principle that remains fixed, though the
expectations of the ratifiers about the scope of the clause may not remain fixed).
60. The most impressive interpretive theories include: John Hart Ely’s
approach whereby a court interpreting the Constitution should focus on neither
original intent or nor modern values “but rather on whether the opportunity to
participate either in the political processes by which values are appropriately
identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have
reached, has been unduly constricted.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 77 (1980). Ely rejected the argument that “[e]ither . . . we must stick
close to the thoughts of those who wrote our Constitution’s critical phrases and
outlaw only those practices they thought they were outlawing, or there is simply
no way for courts to review legislation other than by second-guessing the
legislature’s value choices.” Id. at vii.
Ronald Dworkin proposes an originalist approach to the broad concepts
articulated in the Constitution’s language, but a living constitutionalist approach
for applying those concepts to specific situations. See supra note 25.
Lawrence Lessig has demonstrated that uncovering original intent requires a
court to examine the presuppositions lying behind the original text. Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1184–86 (1993). To interpret
what the framers intended, one must understand the suppositions that they
made about the world. If those suppositions have changed, a judge interpreting
the Constitution must translate the words to take account of those changes—not
to account for modern views of what the Constitution should mean, but simply to
best understand what its framers would have understood had they possessed
modern suppositions. Using numerous examples, he showed that one who seeks
to be faithful to the Constitution’s original meaning cannot simply discover that
meaning and apply it. One must examine the presuppositions that lay behind the
original meaning to translate the constitutional language to a modern context.
For example, that the Constitution explicitly requires proportionality in fines,
but not prison sentences, may mean that at the time of enactment only fines had
to be proportionate. But if a presupposition behind that meaning was that prison
sentences did not exist because criminal punishment generally amounted to a
fine or death, the constitutional language must be translated to remain faithful
to its original meaning. See id. at 1185–86. Lessig did not advocate translation
as a method of constitutional interpretation; his project was simply to show that
it was in some cases more faithful to the original meaning than an interpretative
model that ignored changes in presuppositions. See id. at 1268.
Similarly, living constitutionalists and originalists could object to narrow
originalism on the ground that the semantic meaning of the Constitution’s text
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focused on the individual rights-defining clauses.
C. No Accommodative Method Exists to Interpret the
Constitution’s Elegant Specificities
In contrast to the rich trove of scholarship
accommodating originalism and living constitutionalism
when interpreting rights-defining clauses, a sparse, nonrigorous scholarly consensus holds that the Constitution’s
elegant specificities articulate clear rules that simply mean
what they say.61 An interpretive method is unnecessary for
these clauses, this consensus holds, because they interpret
themselves. For example, Brest claimed that “many
provisions of the Constitution may pose no serious
interpretive problems . . . .”62 The age limits for elected
federal officials have been the quintessential example.63 If
the Constitution sets a threshold age for the President at
does not incorporate some fundamental concepts that the founders intended to
include. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 20, at 253–62; Grey, supra note 16, at 715–
18. For example, the right to marry is not mentioned in the Constitution and yet
has been the basis for rejecting legislation as unconstitutional. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (The Supreme Court held that the
Constitution “extend[s] to certain personal choices central to individual dignity
and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and
beliefs” not mentioned in the document’s text.); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 116 (1996); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–640
(1974); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
61. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 32–34; BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 3, at 228 (“The Constitution contains
‘hard-wired rules’ [that] . . . normally will be applied the same way over time.”);
BARNETT, supra note 20, at 123; Solum, supra note 3, at 21–22 (“It is true that
some provisions of the Constitution have a determinate original meaning . . . .”);
Brest, supra note 39, at 208.
62. Brest, supra note 39, at 208.
63. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 2 (member of House of Representatives
must be at least 25); U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 5 (President must be at least 35).
BARNETT, supra note 20, at 123 (“[S]ome provisions of the Constitution are rulelike enough to be applied directly to most cases without need of intermediate
doctrine. The most oft-cited example of this is the provision limiting the
presidency to persons who are at least thirty-five years old.”).
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thirty-five, it has been assumed, one would be hard-pressed
to argue that it imposes a different threshold. No
interpretive method is necessary.
Most recently, Balkin—despite his professed living
constitutionalism in individual rights-defining cases—best
articulated why most scholars see no need for a method to
interpret what he calls the “constitutional rules” embodied
in the elegantly specific clauses.64 Constitutional standards
and principles—like due process or freedom of speech—
Balkin contends, “channel political decisionmaking without
foreclosing it.”65 By contrast, he argues that the specific
intra-governmental-dispute-resolving
clauses
foreclose
interpretation: “[w]here the original meaning of the text
states a clear, unambiguous rule, we apply the rule because
that is what the text offers us.”66
Balkin seems to assume that his categories of
constitutional clauses describe a fixed structure of (1)
majestic, open-textured rights-defining clauses—principles
and standards—requiring a living constitutionalist method
to comport with their original meaning; and (2) clear,
specific, unambiguous intra-government-regulating rules
that require no interpretive method at all because there is no
coherent way to read them other than to simply mean what
they say.
But one can alternatively understand Balkin’s lexicon as
a contingent one that varies depending on the evolution of
constitutional meaning. Standards and principles—within
64. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 43, 215. Brest made a
similar point in his seminal article The Misconceived Quest for an Original
Understanding: “The text and original understanding exert the strongest
claims . . . where they specify the procedures and numbers relating to elections,
appointments to government offices, and the formal validity of laws, where
certainty is an important objective or inherently arbitrary lines must be drawn.”
Brest, supra note 39, at 229.
65. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 43.
66. Id. at 42–43 (A general agreement in constitutional interpretative debates
is that the “relatively precise rules” in the Constitution “must [be] follow[ed]
today, even if we think them unjust or unwise.”).
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this alternate view—are clauses in which the modern
meaning of the text has evolved from the original
expectations of those who drafted and ratified the
Constitution. By contrast, Balkin’s “rules” constitute clauses
in which our conception of the text has not evolved from the
founders’ original expectation. The rule appears clear
because we share the value motivating the rule, not because
of something inherent in the rule.67 Due process may mean
something different today from what it meant in 1791. But
thirty-five years old still means now what it meant then.
Balkin’s non-method for interpreting the constitutional
rules embodied in the elegantly specific clauses may thus
rest on a contingent fact—that expectations about how a rule
applies remain unchanged—not, as he seems to suggest, a
structural aspect of rule-based clauses that necessarily fixes
their meaning for all time. And with respect to many specific
constitutional clauses, expectations certainly could change.
For example, given modern understandings of varying levels
of learning abilities and maturity, the meaning of age now
likely communicates a public meaning embodying
psychological factors quite different from those that it
communicated in the 1790s. To be sure, changes in the
meaning of age are unlikely to be significant enough to have
altered its constitutional meaning. But the possibility exists
that it someday could. Should modern learning demonstrate
conclusively
that
twenty-five-year-old
individuals
definitively lack the maturity needed to make serious
governmental decisions, would a chronological twenty-five
year threshold remain appropriate for the House of
Representatives?68 After all, the original meaning of the
67. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 102 (1975) (“In
most cases, rules will have plain meanings not because men believe in intelligible
essences, but because their common interests lead them to categorize the world,
and to subsume facts under the categories, in similar ways.”).
68. In such a case, one could debate whether a court should simply apply the
age threshold stated in the Constitution or consider the problem-solving rubric
underlying it, that is, that law makers and enforcers obtain a certain level of
maturity before holding office. See infra Part III. Robert Bennett has argued that
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Constitution’s age thresholds surely encompassed more than
merely revolutions around the sun.69
And the meaning of other apparently clear constitutional
rules is far less stable than our conception of age. On their
face, the Elections Clause (“each State by the Legislature
thereof”70) and the Recess Appointments Clause
(“[v]acancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate”71)are rules as ostensibly specific as those setting an
age threshold. Indeed, that false clarity led Chief Justice
Roberts to adopt the elegantly-specific moniker. Yet, as the
next Part illustrates, the Court was bitterly divided over how
to interpret them.72
In those cases, Balkin’s tacit assumption about the fixed
nature of the language articulating rule-based clauses did
not hold up.73 Modern meaning may remain consistent with
original expectations for some rule-like clauses, but not
other seemingly clear rules may similarly create interpretive challenges. Robert
W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 78, 118–19, 135 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B.
Solum eds., 2011) (discussing the language of the Twelfth Amendment and using
example of West Virginia’s statehood application as an example of questions
arising about the meaning of the two Senator rule).
69. Of course, one could argue—as some originalists surely would—that
should the meaning of age change in a compelling way, the appropriate response
would be to amend the Constitution. The argument over whether and to what
extent courts should have the power to alter constitutional law in response to
evolving meaning lies at the core of the originalist/living constitutionalist debate.
Although it is an important point of conflict that deserves more careful attention
than it has received in the constitutional literature, it falls beyond the scope of
this Article, which takes as a given that living constitutionalism is a legitimate
alternative theory of constitutional interpretation.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
72. See infra Section II.A–B.
73. To be sure, Balkin might legitimately argue that he means to include in
his category of rules only those clauses for which the meaning has in fact
remained fixed. He might place clauses like the Elections Clause or the Recess
Appointments Clause in the category of constitutional standards, even though
they look like rules. But then, the category choice would be based on something
other than the form of the clause. And Balkin does not address how one would
categorize constitutional provisions other than by their form.
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others. And in the latter case, the ostensibly specific
language can be just as difficult to interpret as the
majestically general, rights-defining clauses.74 By failing to
articulate an interpretive method for these clauses, the
scholarly community has left the courts without the guidance
available in cases involving the majestic generalities.
II. A DIVIDED COURT GRAPPLES WITH THE CONSTITUTION’S
ELEGANT SPECIFICITIES
This Part reviews two recent cases in which the Court
bitterly divided in interpreting ostensibly specific intra74. With respect to scholarship focusing on specific intra-governmental
regulating clauses, the best work has focused narrowly on founding-era evidence,
arguing that the rule of law commitment requires modern courts to apply the
original understanding. See, e.g., Amelia Frenkel, Defining Recess Appointments
Clause “Vacancies,” 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 729 (2013); Edward A. Hartnett, Recess
Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 377, 400–01 (2005); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1750–51 (2002); John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693,
1733–37 (2010); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional
Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L 1 (2010) (analyzing the
Elections Clause); Robert G. Natelson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies
that May Happen During the Recess” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments
Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (2014) (relying on pre-ratification era
sources); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1509 (2005) (analyzing the Recess
Appointments Clause); Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of
Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 321, 327–43 (1993);
Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2208–09 (1994); Jeff VanDam, The
Kill Switch: The New Battle over Presidential Recess Appointments, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 361, 388–91 (2012); Stuart J. Chanen, Comment, Constitutional
Restrictions on the President’s Power to Make Recess Appointments, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 191, 193 (1984); Kevin K. Green, Note, A Vote Properly Cast? The
Constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIS. 45,
51–60 (1996).
Amicus briefs filed in Canning by originalist scholars and constitutional
law scholars similarly urged the court to focus exclusively on founding era
evidence. Brief of Originalist Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12-1281), 2013
WL 6213265; Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12-1281), 2013 WL
6213263.
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governmental dispute-resolving clauses. The analysis in both
cases tracked the originalist-living constitutionalist
paradigm. The dissenting originalist justices cited founding
era evidence of the most natural reading of the clauses,
treating subsequent developments as irrelevant.75 The
prevailing living constitutionalists found ambiguity.76 This
uncertainty, they claimed, freed them to conclude that the
purpose of the clause justified an interpretation different
from the most natural reading of the text.77
The following sub-sections briefly review each case,
revealing the utter lack of any path to accommodate both
originalist and living constitutionalist methods into a single
method for this type of constitutional clause.
A. NLRB v. Canning78—The Recess Appointment Case
In 2010, expiring terms left the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) “without a full slate of five members.”79

75. See discussion infra Section II.B–C.
76. Commentators suggested that the majority opinions manufactured
ambiguity to reach a desirable result. See, e.g., Constitutional ‘Chumps,’ WALL
STREET J. (June 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/constitutional-chumps1435614085 (“A miserable Supreme Court term got worse on Monday when
another 5-4 majority decided to rewrite the Constitution’s Elections Clause to
limit legislative redistricting.”); Gene Veith, Supreme Court Can’t Tell What
“Legislature” Means, CRANACH BLOG (July 7, 2015), http://www.patheos.
com/blogs/geneveith/2015/07/supreme-court-cant-tell-what-legislature-means/
(The majority in Arizona State Legislature did “not want[ ] the Constitution to
get in the way of their favored policies.”); Mike Rappaport, The Statutory
Limitation on Recess Appointments, LIBRARY LAW & LIBERTY (May 28, 2015),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/05/28/the-statutory-limitation-on-recessappointments/ [https://perma.cc/EH7K-TJXA] (“Justice Breyer’s opinion for the
majority [in Canning] has . . . misinterpreted the Recess Appointments Clause.”);
Michael Ramsey, NLRB v. Noel Canning and Originalism (Updated),
ORIGINALISM BLOG (June 27, 2014 6:32 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.
com/the-originalism-blog/2014/06/nlrb-v-noel-canning-and-originalismmichaelramsey.html (describing the majority opinion in Canning as “an ugly bit of nonoriginalism”).
77. See discussion infra Section II.B–C.
78. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
79. Mark Landler & Steven Greenhouse, Vacancies and Partisan Fighting
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Angered by the Board’s filing a case against Boeing and its
general opposition to the Board’s mission, the Republican
minority in the Senate filibustered the President’s
nominees.80 To prevent the Board from losing its threemember quorum, the President used a recess appointment to
provide a third member.81 In late 2011, the Senate still had
not confirmed permanent members; the initial recess
appointment expired; and the Board lost its quorum.82
The President had nominated three candidates to fill the
open seats, one in early 2011 and two others toward the
year’s end.83 In December 2011, the Senate recessed having
failed to confirm (or explicitly reject) any of the nominees.84
Although the Democratic majority controlling the Senate
would likely have supported the nominees, the Republican
minority threatened to filibuster.85 But the Senators in
opposition did not argue that the appointees were the
President’s cronies or otherwise lacked labor law expertise.
In early 2012, the President exercised his recess
appointment power to place his three nominees on the
Board.86
With its newly appointed members participating, the
NLRB held that Noel Canning, a Pepsi distributor, violated
the labor laws.87 Canning appealed, arguing that the
Put Labor Relations Agency in Legal Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/us/politics/vacancies-and-partisan-fightingput-labor-relations-agency-in-legal-limbo.html; see also Melanie Trottman,
Obama Makes Recess Appointments to the NLRB, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 4, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020351360457714141191915231
8.
80. Landler & Greenhouse, supra note 79.
81. See Trottman, supra note 79.
82. See id.
83. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
84. Id.
85. See Landler & Greenhouse, supra note 79.
86. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2257.
87. See id.
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President had unconstitutionally appointed three of the five
members, and the Board thus lacked a quorum and could not
legitimately decide the case.88
The Constitution ordinarily requires the President to
obtain “the advice and consent of the Senate” before
appointing a federal official.89 But the Recess Appointments
Clause empowers the President “to fill up all vacancies”
unilaterally where an opening “may happen during the
recess of the Senate.”90 Canning argued that the early 2012
appointments violated the clause because the recess—only
three days—was too short to permit legitimate unilateral
appointments.91 Although the Senate had stopped doing
business on December 17, 2011, and did not intend to return
until January 23, 2012, it resolved to meet twice a week in
pro forma session.92 Rather than a single five-week break,
the Senate rotated between recesses of no more than three
days and pro forma sessions.93
The D.C. Circuit ruled for Canning, holding that
President Obama exceeded his constitutional authority.
According to the court, the Recess Appointments Clause
applied only to:
• recesses between sessions (inter-session), not within a
session (intra-session);94 and
• vacancies originally opening—“that may happen” in

88. Id. (citing New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687–688 (2010)
for the proposition that in the absence of a lawfully appointed quorum, the Board
cannot exercise its powers).
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
91. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. On January 3, 2012, the new session of Congress formally began—
although the Senate was in recess—and the President appointed the Board
members the next day. The appointment thus technically occurred during an
intra-session recess. Id. at 2557–58.
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the language of the clause—during the recess and not
to vacancies that existed before the recess began.95
Because the NLRB openings had originated before the
Senate stopped doing business, and the President waited
until the inter-session recess had ended and an intra-session
recess had begun before appointing the board members, the
Circuit Court rejected the appointments.
The Supreme Court granted the Board’s petition for
certiorari, and a five-member majority rejected the two
grounds on which the D.C. Circuit had relied.96 But, it ruled
in favor of Canning on the length-of-the-recess ground.97
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, found the language of
the clause ambiguous with respect to both: “the Recess” and
“vacancies that may happen during . . . .”98 The former could
refer to any recess of the Senate, not just inter-session
recesses.99 Similarly, the phrase “may happen” ambiguously
could mean either a vacancy opening after a recess had
begun or one that continued to be open during a recess even
if it had originated earlier.100 In finding ambiguity, Justice
Breyer acknowledged that the Court did not interpret the
phrases in the most natural way.101 But he believed that any
ambiguity permitted the Court to resolve the issue by looking
to the clause’s underlying purpose,102 that is, to permit the

95. Id. at 2558.
96. See id. at 2557–58.
97. Id. at 2557.
98. Id. at 2562–73 (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 2561.
100. Id. at 2568–69.
101. See id. at 2568.
102. Id. (“[T]he linguistic question here is not whether the phrase can be, but
whether it must be, read more narrowly. The question is whether the Clause is
ambiguous. And the broader reading, we believe, is at least a permissible reading
of a ‘“doubtful”’ phrase. We consequently go on to consider the Clause’s purpose
and historical practice.” (internal citations omitted)). The majority’s
acknowledged need to “hesitate [before] upset[ting] the compromises and working
arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have
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President unilaterally to appoint officials when the Senate
was out of session, regardless of the type of recess.103
Citing a brief filed by originalist scholars, the majority
acknowledged that “the Founders would likely have intended
the Clause to apply only to inter-session recesses, for they
hardly knew any other.”104 But that reasoning, Justice
Breyer explained “does not fully describe the relevant
founding intent.”105 The proper focus, the Court insisted, was
whether “the Founders intend[ed] to restrict the scope of the
Clause to the form of congressional recess then prevalent, or
did they intend a broader scope permitting the Clause to
apply, where appropriate, to somewhat changed
circumstances?”106 Because they knew that the Constitution
would be “a document designed to apply to ever-changing
circumstances over centuries,” the Court concluded, “the
Framers likely did intend the Clause to apply to a new
circumstance that so clearly falls within its essential
purposes, where doing so is consistent with the Clause’s
language.”107 The Court thus rejected the grounds on which
the D.C. Circuit had found the appointments
unconstitutional.108
With respect to Canning’s argument that the recess had

reached” belies any true commitment to follow the clause’s original meaning. Id.
at 2560.
103. See id. at 2559 (The clause “grant[ed] the President the power to make
appointments during a recess but not offering the President the authority
routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at
455 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Recess Appointment Clause superseded the
Advice and Consent Clause when the Senate recessed, and “it might be necessary
for the public service to fill [the vacancy] without delay.”).
104. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2564 (citing Brief of Originalist Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 74, at 27–29).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2564–65.
107. Id. at 2565–66 (“The Framers’ lack of clairvoyance on that point is not
dispositive.”).
108. See id. at 2561–73.
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been too short, however, the Court saw things differently.109
To fit within the constitutional scheme, Justice Breyer
explained, a recess must continue for at least ten days before
a court may treat an appointment as presumptively valid; a
shorter recess would not support a unilateral appointment,
unless an unusual circumstance—not including “political
opposition”—compelled an immediate appointment.110
The government argued that, as a practical matter, the
recess in question lasted longer than ten days because the
Senate did not meet as a functional body for a month.111 The
Court rejected that reasoning because the Senate “retain[ed]
the capacity to transact Senate business” during its pro
forma sessions.112 A recess existed only when the Senate was
“unable,” not just “unwilling,” to act.113 The clause, Justice
Breyer concluded, “is not designed to overcome serious
institutional friction. It simply provides a subsidiary method
for appointing officials when the Senate is away during
a recess.”114
In a conflicting opinion concurring in the judgment,
Justice Scalia, writing for four members of the Court, agreed
with the D.C. Circuit that the clause’s original meaning
limited it to inter-session breaks and vacancies opening
during such a recess.115 Although he did not believe that the
Court should consider the clause’s purpose,116 he argued that
109. See id. at 2567, 2573–77. The Court also relied heavily on a history of
recess appointments lacking significant opposition to intra-session appointments
to fill vacancies originating before the recess began. See id. at 2561–64.
110. Id. at 2567.
111. See id. at 2573–77.
112. Id. at 2574. The Court explained that despite the absence of a quorum,
the Senate could and often did do business via unanimous consent agreements.
A single Senator, by noting the absence of a quorum, could throw the Senate into
recess if the members could not be brought to the chamber. Id. at 2576.
113. Id. at 2575 (emphasis removed).
114. Id. at 2577.
115. See id. at 2592, 2598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 2598.
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it was consistent with the clear original meaning—to limit
the President’s ability to make appointments without Senate
input to times when the Senate could not possibly provide
timely advice and consent.117
B. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission118
Through a public initiative—without the participation of
the state’s legislative body—Arizona empowered an
independent commission to redraw its Congressional district
lines.119 The initiative’s proponents intended the commission
to combat partisan gerrymandering,120 a practice that the
Supreme Court had previously acknowledged to be
problematic.121
The Arizona Legislature challenged the initiative’s
constitutionality. It argued that the commission’s redrawing
of the district lines violated the Elections Clause, which
provides that “[t]he times, places and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such
regulations . . . .”122
The Arizona Legislature argued that the clause
permitted only “the representative body which makes the
laws” to draw Congressional district lines.123 The
Commission countered that the Elections Clause required
only that the state draw lines in accordance with its
legislative power as defined by its own constitution, which in
117. See id.
118. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
119. Id. at 2658.
120. Id.
121. See id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
123. Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659.
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Arizona included the initiative.124 A divided three-judge
District Court panel dismissed the case.125
Justice Ginsberg, writing for a five-justice majority,
acknowledged that in the late-1700s the initiative process
was largely unknown.126 Nevertheless, then-contemporary
dictionaries established ambiguity as to whether “the
Legislature” meant exclusively a representative body.127 As
the Canning majority had done, Justice Ginsberg explained
that this ambiguity allowed the Court to examine the
clause’s purpose. Because it empowered Congress to draw or
override state-drawn lines, the Elections Clause protected
against the possibility that a state might fail to (1) draw
Congressional district lines at all; or (2) do so improperly out
of a conflict of interest.128 The founders did not intend, the
Court held, for the clause “to restrict the way States enact
legislation.”129 Justice Ginsburg added that “[w]hile
attention [during the founding era] focused on potential
abuses by state-level politicians, and the consequent need for
congressional oversight, the legislative processes by which
the States could exercise their initiating role in regulating
congressional elections occasioned no debate.”130
The majority then recognized that, when the initiative
process came into wide use in the early twentieth century,
Congress recognized it as a legitimate basis for
redistricting.131 And Ginsburg agreed with the legislature,
explaining that “the people themselves are the originating

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2671 (Dictionaries of the late eighteenth to early nineteenth
centuries defined legislature as “the power that makes laws”).
128. Id. at 2672.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2669.
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source of all the powers of government,”132 and “it is
characteristic of our federal system that States retain
autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.”133
Acknowledging the counter-originalist nature of its decision,
the Court explained that, although the founding generation
“may not have imagined the modern initiative process in
which the people of a State exercise legislative power
coextensive
with
the
authority
of
an
institutional legislature[,] . . . the initiative was in full
harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as
the font of governmental power.”134
Dissenting on behalf of four justices, Chief Justice
Roberts cited overwhelming evidence that objective readers
in the 1780s would have understood the term legislature to
mean a representative body.135 He described Arizona’s use of
the initiative process as a “deliberate constitutional evasion,”
and the Court’s decision to approve it as a “magic trick.”136
C. The Common Pattern
Both Canning and Arizona State Legislature followed a
similar pattern in which five member majorities prevailed
over vigorous dissents with no apparent accommodative
efforts on either side. The problem was not a lack of scholarly
attention. In both cases, academic theorists filed multiple
amicus briefs. But those briefs provided no method to
accommodate the Constitution’s dual commitments to both a
Rule of Law and ongoing self-governance. The winner was
simply the one that gathered the most votes. The following
Part presents a new method that would enable the courts to
move past this stalemate.
132. Id. at 2656–57.
133. Id. at 2673.
134. Id. at 2674.
135. Id. 2679–85 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Legislature’ was ‘not a term of
uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution.”).
136. Id. at 2677–78.
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INTRODUCING FARSIGHTED ORIGINALISM

This Part proceeds in four sections. First, it introduces
the challenge of identifying an interpretive method for the
Constitution’s elegant specificities that incorporates the dual
commitments to both self-governance and the Rule of Law.
This Part explains that farsighted originalism meets this
challenge by recognizing the superposition of original public
meaning flowing from the problem-solving rubric embodied
in each relevant clause. Second, it places this new
interpretive method within the context of an existing critique
of originalist methods that rely solely on the semantic
content of constitutional clauses. Third, using examples, this
Part explains and justifies this new way of looking at original
meaning. Fourth, it sets out a five-step procedure that a
court would use to apply farsighted originalism, and it then
applies that procedure to the Court’s recent cases
interpreting elegantly specific clauses.
A. The Challenge in Interpreting the Constitution’s Elegant
Specificities
The best interpretive methods developed for the
Constitution’s majestically general individual rightsdefining clauses are inappropriate for cases involving the
elegant specificities because the two types of clauses serve
different purposes. The generalities are, well, general in
scope and designed to articulate universal principles
mediating the interaction between power-wielding
governmental actors and more or less powerless people.
Accommodative interpretive methods for these clauses focus
on the extent to which the founding generation would have
expected the vague, open textured constitutional language to
evolve or remain fixed.137
The specificities, by contrast, address particular
problems embodying conflict across branches or levels of

137. See discussion supra Part I.
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government, all of which possess roughly equal power.138
Because the terms are so clear, the sparse scholarship
engaging these clauses assumes that interpretive difficulties
will not arise.139 But the Court’s recent cases confirm that
they do.140 The challenge is to develop an interpretative
method that—like the best methods applied in the majestic
generalities’ cases—accommodates (1) the rule of law
embodied in the Constitution’s original meaning; without (2)
stifling the document’s self-governance commitment.141
Farsighted originalism meets this challenge by
recognizing that the original public meaning of an intragovernmental-conflict-resolving
clause
embodies
a
superposition of ways that the rubric embodied in the
constitutional language could be applied to disagreements
between branches of government or different sovereigns.
Farsighted originalism is consistent with the Rule of Law
because it rests on the problem-solving rubric embedded in
original meaning of the constitutional text. Historical
evidence of the type normally accepted by originalists defines
this superposition of meanings.
The proposed method also accommodates the selfgovernance commitment by recognizing the range of
meanings within the superposition, all of which would have
rung true for the founding generation and from which the
current generation can resolve modern problems. The
citizens of the early 1790s may not have foreseen the
particular modern problem that we face today. But because
the superposition of original public meanings flows from the
problem-solving rubric conveyed by the Constitution’s words,
if the founding generation had faced our challenge, they

138. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1033, 1046 (1981) (“Intentions do not exist in the abstract; they are forged in
response to particular circumstances . . . .”).
139. See discussion supra Section I.C.
140. See discussion supra Part II.
141. Id.
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would have understood and accepted the farsighted
originalism interpretation.
This approach thus provides for a spectrum of
interpretive options allowing each American generation to
seek a more perfect union consistent with and bounded by
the superposition of original public meanings embodied in
the elegantly specific constitutional clauses resolving intragovernmental disputes.142
B. Farsighted Originalism and the Existing Critique of
Semantic Originalism
The critical aspect of the interpretive method proposed
here—that semantic meaning cannot convey the full original
public meaning of the Constitution—is not new. Other
scholars have emphasized that constitutional language is
“generally modeled on strategic, not cooperative,
principles.”143 By its nature, the Constitution incorporates
“tacitly acknowledged incomplete decisions,” if not
conflicting meanings, because agreement on a single
understanding proved elusive to the founders and the
broader public.144 This critique generally concludes that
semantic originalism has failed to overcome the
interpretative challenges that plagued intent-based

142. To step beyond the superposition of original public meaning would require
a constitutional amendment. An originalist might argue that any interpretation
exceeding the precise application to which an intra-governmental conflict
resolving clause should require an amendment. The dividing line between
amendment and legitimate interpretation of existing language has been
addressed many times, albeit unsatisfactorily. This Article does not seek to define
the precise dividing line between interpretation and amendment.
143. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 732, 750 (2013) (providing an example of the differing
Federalist and anti-Federalist approaches to interpreting the Constitution).
144. Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some
Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 83, 97 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011)
(emphasis removed); see also Cornell, supra note 143, at 731–40; Michelman,
supra note 8, at 1501, 1520.
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originalism and thus rejects the originalist method.145
By contrast, farsighted originalism incorporates the
range of meaning embodied in the Constitution into an
originalist method, positing that the original public meaning
incorporates the entire superposition of meaning embedded
in the rubric that the framers chose to resolve a particular
intra-governmental conflict. Rather than use the existence of
a range of meaning to condemn originalism as prior critics
have done, the method proposed here celebrates that range
of meaning, allowing originalism to accommodate the
constitutional commitment to self-governance more
effectively than have some existing forms of originalism.
C. Explaining Farsighted Originalism
The elegantly specific constitutional clauses aimed at
intra-governmental conflict embody problem-solving rubrics,
constituting a superposition of original public meaning. The
founding generation may have considered only one or a small
number of meanings within this superposition. But because
they understood the meaning of the rubric, they could
comprehend the full superposition of meanings and, in
historian Quentin Skinner’s words, “be brought to accept
[them] as a correct description of what [the Constitution’s
words] had meant . . . .”146
145. See Cornell, supra note 143, at 731–40
146. Id. at 728–29 (quoting Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in
the History of Ideas, in MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS
29, 48 (James Tully ed., 1988)). This approach to extracting meaning bears a
resemblance to Skinner’s work. He relied on the language philosopher J.L.
Austin’s theory of speech acts that claimed that “to understand a historical text
one must first define the range of possible meanings an utterance might have had
at a given historical moment.” Id. at 728 (citing Quentin Skinner, Motives,
Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 393 (1972))
(emphasis added). To uncover a text’s meaning, Skinner emphasized a scholar
must explore not just semantic meaning, but also what the relevant interpreter
was doing with the words when they were written. Id. at 730. More recent
historical work in this vein incorporates the work of Paul Grice, P.F. Strawson,
and John Searle, referring to the aspect of meaning transcending semantic
content as the assertive content of the words. See id. Although these approaches
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The non-legal term superposition better communicates a
point that is difficult to convey with standard legal language
—that the elegantly specific clauses mediating intragovernmental
conflict
embody
an
“attribute
of
147
openendedness prior to the prompted choice.”
An
elementary particle in superposition occupies multiple
potential states simultaneously.148 But when prompted, it
decoheres, fixing itself in only one.149 Although the physical
world appears to exist in a fixed state, it consists of
fundamental particles in a superposition of all possible
positions in which they might be found. Reality differs from
standard perception.150
Just as we misleadingly perceive our physical
environment as existing in a single state, we misperceive the
Constitution’s specific clauses to have a single meaning.
Farsighted originalism’s challenge is to show that the
original public meaning of a specific intra-governmentalconflicting-resolving clause extends beyond a single nominal
meaning to a superposition of potential original meanings
that are all consistent with the problem-solving rubric
embodied in the clause.151 The members of the founding
generation may have decohered a clause to the specific
to history and language did not incorporate the problem-solving rubric insight of
farsighted originalism, they do share the intuition that understanding meaning
requires an inquiry into something beyond the semantic meaning of the words.
147. CYD C. ROPP, A SIMPLE EXPLANATION
(2015).

OF

ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING 32

148. CARROLL, supra note 9, at 228–53 (2010) (“The miracle of quantum
mechanics was that there is no longer any such thing as ‘where the object is’; it’s
in a true simultaneous superposition of the possible alternatives, which we know
must be true via experiments.”).
149. Id. at 251.
150. Id. at 229 (The concept of superposition in quantum mechanics renders
“what we can observe about the world . . . only a tiny subset of what actually
exists.” (emphasis in original)).
151. See Solum, supra note 31, at 38 (Semantic originalism is generally
referring to “the actual meaning of the constitutional text in accord with a
particular conception (theory or view) of that meaning” but other theories of
meaning are possible).
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meaning resolving the problem on which the clause was
originally focused. But they understood that rubric could
extend to other problems, producing a broader original public
meaning. Farsighted originalism thus recognizes that the
meaning
of
an
intra-governmental-conflict-resolving
constitutional clause includes all meanings that thoughtful
members of the founding generation would have anticipated
given the problem-solving rubric that they understood to be
embodied in the text.152 And this method seeks to uncover
the specific decoherence that the founding generation would
have culled from the superposition of original public
meanings had they faced the problem we face today.
For example, imagine a simple constitution drafted to
govern a rural community. A clause of this constitution
responded to a then-existing problem—farmers were using
large caliber firearms to rid property of gopher infestations,
creating an unsafe condition. The responsive constitutional
provision read “only small caliber ammunition shall be used
to rid the property of varmint infestations when the property
is unoccupied.” A semantic originalist might conclude that
the original public meaning of the clause limited varmint
control to firearms, the only method—let’s assume—that was
available to them. A modern proposal to use an ultra-sonic
device to rid the property of gofers would thus violate this
constitutional clause absent an amendment.
By contrast, a farsighted originalist would recognize that
the problem addressed in the clause is varmint infestation,
152. Even one day after ratification, a thoughtful member of the public would
have realized, issues would arise on which the Constitution’s words may apply,
but that neither the drafters nor the ratifying voters would have anticipated.
Rakove explores an early example involving James Madison’s struggle in the
1790s as a member of the House of Representatives with the meaning of the
Treaty Clause. As a framer himself, he understood the clause to limit the role of
the House. But as a legislator he struggled with his sense that the clause’s
meaning should encompass a larger legislative role in the context of considering
the Jay Treaty. RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 355–65 (In considering the scope of the
House’s authority with respect to treaty approval “it seems apparent that the
House [including Madison himself] was prepared to entertain interpretations
reconstructing the positions of framers, ratifiers, and ‘the people.’”).
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and the problem-solving rubric imposes a safety-oriented
control method. The superposition of potential original
meanings might thus include traps, poisons, predator
animals, or ultra-sonic devices if they could be employed
safely. In the context of government-conflict-resolving
clauses, this superposition of potential original meanings
accurately ascribes a fixed meaning to the Constitution’s
text, albeit one that is broader than semantic meaning.
The Recess Appointment Clause—the focus of one recent
case—provides a real-world illustrative example of how
farsighted originalism differs from semantic originalism.153
That clause nominally responded to the problem of long
Senate recesses in the context of the era’s slow travel and
communication speeds. Justice Scalia and the justices
joining his originalist opinion in Canning would have strictly
limited the clause to that specific meaning.154 But farsighted
originalism would require a court to uncover the
superposition of potential original meanings that the
problem-solving rubric could embody—that is, how the text
addressed the problem of Senate-caused appointment delays
—to resolve governance problems. Even though the founding
generation may not have foreseen the possibility of long
confirmation delays in conjunction with short recesses, a
rubric designed to accelerate appointments in response to
Senate-caused delay would permit unilateral appointments
during a short recess if the Senate had caused a long delay.155
This farsighted method is originalist because it focuses
on the text at the time it was adopted, acknowledging that
constitutional clauses have (1) a fixed meaning; (2) that
contributes to the content of constitutional rules; and (3) that

153. To be sure, semantic originalism encompasses a wide swath of scholars
who understand originalism in a variety of different ways. The comparison drawn
in the text, however, incorporates the fundamental core of semantic originalism:
principles that would likely be accepted by most originalists.
154. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2598 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. This issue is analyzed in more detail at infra Section III.D.
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deserves our fidelity and constrains courts.156 Importantly,
the superposition of potential meanings does not include all
possible meanings. For example, a particle capable of
spinning left or right has both spin qualities in superposition.
But when prompted, it will be spinning left or right. It won’t
decohere to a state spinning on a horizontal axis.157 Just as
particles have a limited range of possible spins, farsighted
originalism retains the fixation thesis essential to the
originalist method by limiting itself to the particular range
of potential meanings within the rubric that would have been
understood by the founding generation.
Farsighted originalism thus retains originalism’s core
requirements, seeking to rely objectively “on external,
demonstrable historical evidence . . . .”158 and prohibits new
conceptions of clauses not within the ambit of the problemsolving rubric.159 The superposition of potential meanings
would not, for example, include an interpretation of an
ambiguous clause if the founding generation would have
rejected that interpretation through the interpretive
methods they would have used.160 And vagueness leading to
under-determinateness would remain in the realm of
constitutional construction,161 enabling the text to retain
156. Solum, supra note 31, at 2–9.
157. ROPP, supra note 147, at 32; see CARROLL, supra note 9, at 231–32.
158. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 195.
159. See Solum, supra note 31, at 2 (“[T]he fixation thesis is the claim that
semantic content of the Constitution (the linguistic meaning of the Constitution)
is fixed at the time of adoption.” (emphasis in original)).
160. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction,
103 NW. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) (Original public meaning includes “the
interpretive rules that were customarily applied to such a document” by the
founding generation.).
161. Farsighted originalism would not run afoul of Whittington’s concern that
“[t]he new meanings that words may acquire over time could not have been
foreseen and intended by anyone, and the meaning they may appear to give the
law is not a meaning that has been authorized by any legitimate body.”
WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 59. But this is true only in limited contexts such
as the sense in which “bad” now sometimes means “good.” See Bad, THE FREE
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originalism’s fuzzy frame quality limiting potential
constructions.162 To be sure, the farsighted method will not
produce easy clear answers. Like all forms of originalism,
however, this method “neither pretend[s] to uphold nor
[should it] be criticized for failing to meet,” in Whittington’s
words, “standards of proof that eliminate the significance
and role of an interpreter making an argument.”163
D. Applying Farsighted Originalism
A farsighted originalist interpreting an intragovernmental-conflict-resolving clause would engage in the
following five-step process:
(1) search for the original semantic meaning of the
clause at issue;
(2) identify the problem that the clause sought to

DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/bad (last visited July 17, 2015)
(“The first known example [of using bad to mean good] dates from 1897. . . . This
is by no means uncommon; people use words sarcastically to mean the opposite
of their actual meanings on a daily basis. What is more unusual is for such a
usage to be generally accepted within a larger community. Perhaps when the
concepts are as basic as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ this general acceptance is made easier.”).
Whittington is certainly correct that if the original Constitution used the word
“bad,” a modern court should not now interpret it to mean “good” despite the
modern meaning of the word. That would conflict with the common meaning
understood during the founding era. But text incorporating a problem solving
rubric addressed to a particular problem could be extended to solve a related—
but unanticipated—problem without contradicting original meaning. It could be
both foreseen in principle and therefore embodied in the original public meaning.
To be sure, the founding generation might not have intended or expected a
particular result. But Whittington has made clear that the interpreter must
account for meanings and not “expectations about effects.” WHITTINGTON, supra
note 2, at 178, 187. Meaning can include an evolutionary aspect even if the
citizens of the late seventeenth century would not then have anticipated
particular outcomes that would flow from the words. See supra Section III.C
(discussing the superposition of potential meanings).
162. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 430 (1985)
(Constitutional text “establishes a boundary, or a frame, albeit a frame with fuzzy
edges. Even though the language itself does not tell us what goes on within the
frame, it does tell us when we have gone outside it.”); BARNETT, supra note 20, at
125 (citing Schauer, supra, at 430).
163. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 195.
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address;
(3) determine how the public meaning of the text
engaged that problem, that is, what problem-solving
rubric does the meaning embody;
(4) determine how that rubric would be applied to the
current question consistently with the original public
meaning embodied in the problem-solving rubric; and
(5) if the original meaning cannot tell us how to apply the
problem-solving rubric to the current question,
engage in constitutional construction to resolve the
issue.
Farsighted originalism is identical to various wellarticulated forms of semantic originalism at the first and
fifth steps. The intermediate steps are new and reject at the
interpretative stage a semantic meaning limited to the
founding generation’s specific expectation as to the role the
intra-governmental-conflict-resolving clause would play.
These steps incorporate the notion that the framers aimed
the Constitution’s specific intra-government-conflictresolving clauses at anticipated problems, and those clauses
thus embody problem-solving rubrics that embody a
superposition of original public meanings. To acknowledge
the complete meaning of the clause, an interpreter must
consider all of the potential ways that the rubric could be
employed to deal with the identified problem and those
within a similar frame, that is, the superposition of all
potential original meanings.
This Part applies the five parts of the farsighted
originalist method to the Court’s recent decisions in Canning
and Arizona State Legislature, producing results and
rationales that differ from the majority opinions in
significant ways.164
164. This Part is intended to illustrate how a judge should apply farsighted
originalism, relying on the information available from the opinions in the two
cases. To the extent that additional historical information were to come to light
bearing on the meaning of the problem-solving rubric in each clause, the analysis
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1. Canning & Farsighted Originalism
Under the facts in Canning, farsighted originalism—like
the Court itself—would hold that a unilateral appointment
during an intra-session recess to fill a vacancy existing when
the Senate adjourned would not per se violate the Recess
Appointments clause. The problem-solving rubric should
reach all vacancies and recesses because of the broad
authority the clause granted the President to fill vacant
offices during a recess.
But the Court’s narrow focus on the formal length of a
recess is inconsistent with the result that farsighted
orginalism would reach. The clause’s problem solving rubric
permitted the President to unilaterally appoint an official
during the recess, regardless of how little time remained
before the Senate planned to commence doing business. If
the President could fill a recess opening just one day before
the Senate was set to return, making the length of the recess
the critical factor is inconsistent with the farsighted original
public meaning of the clause. A test focusing on whether
Senate-caused delay prevented the President from filling a
vacancy for several months would better comport with the
rubric embodied in the text.
This Section applies each of the five steps of the
farsighted originalism test to the Canning facts.
a. Semantic Meaning. Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in
the judgment165 and Michael Rappaport’s 2005 law review
article on the Recess Appointment Clause166 demonstrated
that the founding generation understood that clause to
permit the President to fill a vacancy without the Senate’s
advice or consent when the office came open during an intersession recess. The plain meaning of the text; contemporary
practice; and contemporary expert views all coalesce to
here could change.
165. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592–618 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
166. See Rappaport, supra note 74.
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support this conclusion.
b. Identifying the Problem. The problem to which the Recess
Appointments Clause addressed itself was Senate-caused
delay in filling vacancies. The normal constitutional process
required the Senate to advise the President and consent to
an appointment before a federal official could begin work.
The founding generation would thus have understood the
relevant constitutional language to require the President
typically to present a nominee to the Senate and receive
advice and consent in short order. That process could not
function efficiently, however, when the Senate took what
were anticipated to be multi-month recesses.
To combat the problem of Senate-caused delay in filling
vacancies that resulted from long recesses, the Recess
Appointment Clause granted the President unfettered
discretion to make time-limited unilateral appointments at
any point during the recess. The Federalist Papers confirm
this understanding: “it might be necessary for the public
service to fill [vacancies] without delay, the [Recess
Appointments Clause] is evidently intended to authorise the
President singly to make temporary appointments.”167
Justice Scalia disagreed with this interpretation of the
clause, contending that delay in permitting officials to begin
their government work was only a small part of the
problem.168 He emphasized what he called the “self-evident
purpose of the Clause: to preserve the Senate’s role in the
appointment process—which the founding generation
regarded as a critical protection against ‘despotism.’”169
Upon close (or even cursory) examination of the
constitutional language, however, no such purpose emerges.
To be sure, in the context of modern concerns over the
imperial presidency, the problem of a diminished role for the

167. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 103, at 455 (emphasis in original).
168. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2597, 2607 (Scalia, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 2597; see also Rappaport, supra note 74, at 1494.
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Senate might seem apparent. But the issue for Justice Scalia
was original meaning, not a modern interpretation. And if
the
founding
generation
understood
the
Recess
Appointments Clause to combat despotism, it was anything
but self-evident. The clause conveyed the President a
strikingly broad and unlimited unilateral appointment
power to fill “all vacancies” during recesses, even though the
Senate was expected to recess every year for many months.
It included neither limits on how long an office would remain
open without a unilateral appointment nor any other sort of
urgency threshold. The President could simply make a recess
appointment to fill a vacancy that opened just one day—even
just one hour—before the next Senate session was set to
begin even if the official in question would not need to
perform any essential duties until after the Senate planned
to return to session.
The only limit that the Clause placed on the President
was that the unilaterally appointed official could serve only
until the end of the next session. But that is really no limit
at all, because the President could simply reappoint the
official when the vacancy arose in the next recess. The Recess
Appointment Clause included no bar to serial recess
appointments. That hardly suggests a strong concern with
preserving the Senate’s role to combat presidential
despotism.
To be sure, the Recess Appointment Clause must be
understood in conjunction with the Advice and Consent
Clause.170 But that clause did not facially empower the
Senate to approve or veto appointments at its discretion. On
the contrary, the chosen phrase—and commentary in the
Federalist papers171—points to a principle that the Senate
170. Although originalism focuses on clause meaning, each clause is
interpreted in light of other relevant parts of the Constitution. So, reference to
the Advice & Consent Clause is appropriate. See Solum, supra note 31, at 108.
171. Publius emphasized that the nomination power rested in the President
alone because “one man of discernment is better fitted to analise and estimate
the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal,
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should generally play a joint role with the President in
ensuring that federal appointees are qualified experts in
their fields, not political cronies of the President. But
cronyism is not despotism, and consent is not approval. We
all consent to many things that we would never approve if we
had a cost-free veto power. And the text does not even
mandate the modern procedure through which the Senate
votes to accept or reject a nominee. A system that presumed
consent after a reasonable period unless the Senate advised
the President that it had found a nominee unacceptable
would comport with the text.
One might contend that the Advice and Consent Clause
required political methods—compromise or personnel
changes brought about by elections—to resolve differences
between the Senate and the President on a nominee. But the
idea of waiting—potentially for years—for elections to break
a logjam would contradict the clear meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, which permitted unfettered unilateral
appointments to avoid potentially very short delays
whenever the President felt that the appointment was
necessary. If the framers had meant to give the Senate broad
power to reject qualified appointees for any reason, the
Constitution would have included words with that meaning
instead of the words the framers chose.
By limiting the President’s unilateral power of
appointment to the recess, it follows that the Recess
Appointment Clause and the Advice and Consent Clause
taken together prohibited the President from circumventing
Senate input.172 The President could not, for example, fail to
nominate anyone to fill a vacancy, waiting for the recess in
or perhaps even of superior discernment.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note
103, at 510. The Advice and Consent Clause was understood to provide “an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend
greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice,
from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity.” Id. at 513.
172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 103, at 455 (“[T]he President and
Senate jointly” act on appointments. (emphasis in original)).
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order to unilaterally appoint his cronies. But if the President
nominated a qualified candidate, and the Senate despite
adequate time for consideration recessed without acting on
the nomination, nothing within the meaning of the clauses
would prevent a recess appointment regardless of the length
of the recess. The constitutional text thus reveals that the
problem the founding generation would have understood the
Recess Appointment Clause to address was delay in qualified
appointees commencing their government work where that
delay was attributable to the Senate.
c. Problem-Solving Rubric. This step uncovers the rubric that
the founding generation would have understood the clause in
question to employ to address the identified problem. Care
must be exercised here so as not to over-emphasize one
aspect of the rubric over another. Just as an analysis of
purpose can be manipulated by focusing on one of many
possible purposes,173 the problem-solving rubric must be
applied with care.
With respect to the Recess Appointment Clause, the
rubric operates to ensure that:
(1) if the President desires to fill a vacancy; and
(2) the Senate caused the delay; then
(3) the President can fill the vacancy unilaterally during
a recess.
The clause anticipates a particular circumstance that
tilted the balance in favor of allowing the President to act
unilaterally—the Senate decided to take a multi-month
inter-session recess. To deal with the problem of unfilled
vacancies during this period, the rubric granted the
President unfettered discretion to fill all vacancies that arose
at any time before the Senate returned to session.

173. Rappaport, supra note 74, at 1494; see also Rappaport, supra note 19, at
893–94; Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV.
616, 624, 633–34 (1949) (exploring the interpretive error of focusing on one of
many purposes that may underlie a written law in the context of a mock case).
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This rubric would prohibit a President from unilaterally
appointing someone during a recess when an opportunity
existed to present a nominee to a sitting Senate, but the
President failed to do so. The Advice and Consent Clause
requires that. But otherwise, it is hard to imagine a broader
unilateral appointment power. The President need not
specify under the language of the clause why an uncounseled
appointment was necessary before the Senate returned to
session, even if the Senate would be returning the very next
day.174
Through the prism of this rubric, the clause’s original
meaning can be seen to embody the notion that promptly
filling positions that might otherwise lay vacant outweighed
the value of Senate consultation if the Senate chose to recess
without confirming a qualified appointee. With respect to the
clause’s nominal meaning, the Senate’s decision to recess for
many months created a substantial risk that offices would go
unfilled for too long, and thus the clause empowered the
President to make unilateral appointments without
restriction. Had Senate input been understood to be equally
or more important, the clause would have limited the
President’s unilateral power to demonstrably exigent
situations or at least to circumstances where the Senate
could not participate for a substantial period of time. The
clause would have included something like if filing the
vacancy promptly is in the national interest or unless the
appointment would come within the final thirty days of the
scheduled recess. Of course, it included neither limitation.
Given the broad discretion granted to the President
during the inter-session recess, the problem-solving rubric
would grant the President unilateral appointment authority
in situations bearing the same characteristics as those
addressed in the clause. The text explicitly grants the
174. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion captured the idea quite well, concluding
that the clause granted “the President the power to make appointments during a
recess but not offering the President the authority routinely to avoid the need for
Senate confirmation.” NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014).
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President virtually unlimited appointment authority in the
one context that was apparent to the founding generation—
a multi-month, Senate-caused delay in filling vacancies. To
deny the President any ability whatsoever to make a recess
appointment in other circumstances arising from Senatecaused delays, no matter how compelling, would contradict
the meaning embodied in this rubric.
d. Applying the Rubric to the Facts. This step applies the
rubric to the challenged conduct—President Obama’s recess
appointments to the NLRB. Under the rubric described
above, the Canning majority correctly held that the clause
permitted recess appointments during some intra-session
recesses and to fill vacancies arising before or during a
recess. Because the rubric addresses the need to fill open
vacancies caused by delays attributable to the Senate, the
type of recess or the status of the Senate when the vacancy
arose are irrelevant to the scope of the recess appointment
power.
The majority also correctly focused on timing as a critical
consideration in deciding when the President would have a
unilateral appointment power. The problem-solving rubric
embodied in the clause was premised on potential delays in
filling vacancies, making timing an important component.
So, allowing a recess appointment after a short delay would
be inconsistent with the rubric.
The majority erred, however, in making the length of the
recess the critical delay-assessing factor rather than the
Senate’s delay in confirming the appointment.175 Focusing on
the length of the recess would permit the President to fill
vacancies unilaterally during a ten day recess, even if the
175. The majority’s schema provided that:
• a recess of less than three days would not permit an appointment;
• a three- to ten-day recess would presumptively be insufficient absent
evidence of an extraordinary need for an official to quickly take office;
and
• a recess of ten days or more would presumptively be sufficient.
Id. at 2566–67.
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vacancy opened before the recess began and the President
failed to present a nominee to the Senate. But the Advice and
Consent Clause prohibits the President from using recess
appointments to frustrate the Senate’s joint role in the
appointment process. The Senate must be the cause of the
delay to trigger the recess appointment power. Moreover,
nothing in either clause suggests that the recess must be an
extended one. On the contrary, the Recess Appointments
Clause explicitly permits the President to immediately fill a
vacancy opening even on the final day of the recess when the
vacancy could be just a matter of hours.
The proper approach looks to whether the continuing
vacancy is attributable to the President or the Senate. If a
vacancy arose before a recess began, the President should
nominate a candidate to satisfy the Advice and Consent
Clause. If the President fails to submit a nomination before
the Senate recesses, then the appointment would not fit
within the meaning of the rubric, because the Senate did not
cause the delay. Congress apparently agreed with this
understanding of the recess appointment power, enacting a
law generally barring payment to recess appointees—if the
position opened before the recess—unless the President had
nominated a candidate before the recess began.176
When the President presented a nominee to the Senate,
the analysis would be different. If a nomination is pending
and the Senate recessed without voting on the nominee, then
the delay is attributable to the Senate and the President
could unilaterally appoint someone to fill the vacancy

176. 5 U.S.C. § 5503 prohibits payment of a recess appointment made to fill a
vacancy opening prior to the beginning of a recess unless a nomination was
pending before the Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 5503(a) (2012). The statute would also
permit payment to a recess appointee if the vacancy arose within thirty days of
the end of the session; or the Senate had rejected a nomination within thirty days
of the end of the session and the recess appointment was of someone other than
the nominee who had been rejected. Id. § 5503(a)(1), (3). This statue also requires
the President to submit a nominee to the Senate for any position filled by a recess
appoint under § 5503(a) within forty days of the beginning of the next session. Id.
§ 5503(b).
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regardless of the recess’s length. It would be incongruous to
permit unfettered recess appointments if the Senate causes
delay in filling vacancies via a recess, but prohibit unilateral
appointments entirely when the Senate causes the same
delay but manipulates its schedule to make the recesses
appear short.177 Similarly, empowering a President
unilaterally to fill a vacancy initially opening shortly before
the end of a recess, but prohibiting the President from filling
a vacancy during the recess that the Senate had refused to
fill for potentially many months smacks of incongruity.
Both of the Canning opinions wrongly suggest that the
clauses at issue compel more deference to the Senate’s role
in the appointment process than the above analysis would
require. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion improperly refers
to Senate “approval” and limits the recess appointment
power to cases in which the Senate is unable—rather than
unwilling—to confirm a nominee.178 But the Constitution’s
text does not require Senate approval. And while the Recess
Appointment Clause does describe a situation in which the
Senate would have been technically unable to act, its
meaning was not so limited. Recall again that the Clause
allows the President to fill unilaterally all vacancies until the
moment the Senate resumed a session. To conclude that a
Senate coming back into session within hours is unable to act
unreasonably elevates form over substance in a way that
does not comport with the farsighted original meaning
embodied in the text. If the Senate is in session, the
President may not unilaterally fill a vacancy because the
Advice and Consent Clause requires respect for the Senate’s
177. One of the benefits of farsighted originalism’s focus on the problemsolving rubric embodied in constitutional text is that it opens up the excluded
middle in this way. Rappaport’s originalism posed a choice between vacancies
that arose during the recess, on the one hand, and all vacancies with no
limitation, on the other. Given that binary choice, he correctly identifies the
public meaning as the former. Rappaport, supra note 74, at 1543–46. By changing
the focus to the problem-solving rubric, the interpreter can see how other
possibilities may accord with the rubric embodied in the text.
178. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59.
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on-going assessment process. But once the Senate recesses
without addressing a nominee, the recess appointment
power kicks in, at least where (1) the Senate has had a
reasonable amount of time to provide advice and consent; or
(2) the President could not have made a pre-recess
appointment because the vacancy opened after the recess
had begun.
Justice Scalia went even further than the Canning
majority. The interaction between the two clauses, he
asserted, conveyed an original public meaning permitting
the Senate to “refuse to confirm any nominee for an office,
thinking the office better left vacant for the time being.”179
The balance stuck by the clauses, he believed, permitted
unilateral appointment only when no possibility existed for
prompt Senate input to fill an important vacancy—that is,
the vacancy arose during a long recess and the Senate could
not reassemble promptly.180
But it is hard to see how that interpretation could
comport with the problem and the rubric developed to
address it. Nothing—not text, constitutional structure, nor
history—suggests that the founding generation would have
understood the Advice and Consent clause to grant the
Senate the ability to prevent qualified nominees indefinitely
from doing the government’s work simply because the Senate
believed that the work did not need to be done. Indeed, the
Recess Appointment Clause flatly contradicted that view by
granting the President broad discretion to make unilateral
appointments—not just when the Senate could not be
assembled for long periods, but even when the Senate was on
the cusp of reconvening if in the President’s sole discretion a
prompt appointment was deemed appropriate.
Farsighted originalism would thus recognize that the
President has the power to unilaterally appoint an official
during any recess if the Senate had an adequate opportunity
179. Id. at 2599 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180. See id.
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to provide advice and consent, but failed to do so, before the
President exercised the unilateral power.
Given generally available information, it appears that
the Senate had adequate time to consider the unilaterallyappointed nominee that President Obama had presented
nearly a year before the recess. But the other two had been
nominated just shortly before their recess appointments. The
Senate had very little time to consider them, and thus under
farsighted
originalism,
the
President’s
unilateral
appointment of those two nominees violated the Recess
Appointment Clause.
e. Constitutional Construction. Given the analysis above, a
court would not need to enter the construction zone to resolve
how the Recess Appointment Clause should apply to the
NLRB appointments at issue in Canning. The meaning
embodied in the rubric designed to solve the problem of
Senate-caused delay in filling vacancies is broad enough to
encompass unilateral appointments during a recess of any
length if the Senate had failed to provide advice and consent
to the President after having a reasonable opportunity to
consider a nominee.
Because farsighted originalism is historically based,
however, additional evidence of the public meaning
understood to be embodied in the Recess Appointment
Clause’s problem-solving rubric could demonstrate that the
meaning is vague with respect to the particular facts
presented in Canning. For example, evidence of a historic
understanding of the President/Senate relationship could
show that the meaning embodied in the rubric may be vague
with respect to factors such as the length of the delay in
acting on a nomination and the conditions producing that
delay. Perhaps any nomination sent to the Senate before it
commenced a recess could receive a recess appointment if the
Senate stopped doing business without first confirming or
rejecting the nominee.181
181. The Congress enacting 5 U.S.C. § 5503 appears to have believed that the
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If the meaning were vague in this respect, the Court
would need to employ the tools of constitutional construction
to develop a rule consistent with the meaning. The analysis
would encompass factors flowing from the clause’s original
public meaning within the framework of the problem-solving
rubric, such as the length of the delay in acting on a nominee;
whether legitimate concerns existed about the nominee’s
qualifications; and whether the Senate was engaged in ongoing evaluative work or simply sitting on a nomination.
2. Arizona
State
Legislature
and
Farsighted
Originalism
In Arizona State Legislature, the problem-solving rubric
in the Elections Clause did not encompass restraining a
state’s authority to decide how to draw district lines so long
as it in fact properly drew them. The rubric gave Congress
oversight authority, and the available evidence suggested
that Congress would not object to the initiative process.
This Section applies each of the five farsightedoriginalism steps to the Arizona State Legislature facts.
a. Semantic Meaning. Chief Justice Robert’s dissenting
opinion demonstrated that the founding generation
understood the use of the term “legislature” in the Elections
Clause nominally to mean a representative body.182 The
plain meaning of the text, contemporary practice, and
contemporary expert views all coalesce to support this
conclusion.183
recess appointment power legitimately extended to any situation in which the
President nominated a candidate, no matter how close to the beginning of the
recess. Indeed, Congress would have permitted recess appointments where the
President failed to present a nominee to the Senate if the position opened less
than thirty days before the end of the session. 5 U.S.C. § 5503(a)(1). A later
Congress’s view, of course, cannot establish the original public meaning of a
clause. And in this case, the rubric embodied by the clause may grant less
authority to the President than a later Congress did.
182. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2679–80 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 2679–85 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

2017]

ELEGANT SPECIFICITIES

601

b. Identifying the Problem. The Elections Clause responded
to a two-pronged problem. Although the new government
depended on states holding elections and sending
representatives, the framers were concerned that states
would not play ball because they feared that the new
national government would improperly usurp state
authority.184 The Clause responded to that problem by
granting states the power, in the first instance, to draw
election district lines while also empowering Congress to step
in if the state failed to act properly. So long as the state used
its authority responsibly, it could control the election of
House members within the state.185
c. Problem Solving Rubric. The problem-solving rubric
involved explicitly respecting state authority—to assuage
concerns about an intrusive federal government—while
maintaining a reserve federal power, just in case.186 Had the
Constitution been silent, the presumption under the Tenth
Amendment would have been that a state would need to
draw its own district lines.187 The only reason to include the
Elections Clause was to ensure that the state did in fact
fulfill this responsibility by creating a federal backup. The
rubric embodied in the Elections Clause essentially used
explicit respect as the sugar to help the backup congressional
power medicine to go down.

184. Id. at 2672.
185. See Brief for Jack N. Rakove & Richard R. Beeman et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellees, Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314), 2015 WL 309083, at *21–*26
[hereinafter Historian Brief].
186. See RAKOVE, supra note 8, at 181–84 (discussing Anti-Federalist concerns
with expansive national powers).
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
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d. Applying the Rubric to the Facts. The Elections Clause’s
rubric permitted a state’s use of an initiative procedure to
create a district line-drawing commission that could act
without input from the state’s legislative body. The existing
evidence indicates that the rubric did not incorporate any
restraint on state authority beyond ensuring that proper
district lines were drawn.188 Of course, the question is one of
historical fact, and it is possible to imagine rational reasons
to require a representative body rather than another
legislative method to draw district lines. But there appears
to be no historical record supporting a substantive preference
for a representative body within the Elections Clause’s
problem-solving rubric.189
Absent historical evidence that the rubric sought to
restrict the scope of state authority, the original meaning of
the Clause could not have been to prohibit line-drawing by
initiative. The public meaning embodied in the first staterespectful aspect of the rubric designed to safeguard state
authority could not be infringed by Arizona’s use of a
legitimate means of exercising the legislative power.
Arizona’s reliance on the initiative process could
potentially have triggered the aspect of the rubric that
empowered Congress to re-draw improper lines if (1) the
process were not a legitimate exercise of the legislative
power; or (2) the line-drawing that emerged was
substantively improper. But here, the initiative process was

188. See Historian Brief, supra note 185, at *32–*33, *35 (“Given the political
context of 1787–1788, when the victorious Federalists were heaping so much
obloquy on state legislatures, the idea of creating an independent commission to
perform such a task would not have been inconsistent with this theory of the
people’s ultimate capacity to act constitutionally.”). Further, “the decision by the
people of Arizona to establish an independent redistricting commission is fully
consistent with the political values underlying the Constitution, even if the
legislative initiative had yet to be conceived in the 1780s.” Id.
189. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2672 (explaining that the
framers focused on the states’ potential reluctance to draw district lines or to
draw them properly, but not on how the state power to draw lines should be
exercised).
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used to overcome concerns about gerrymandered
congressional district lines. Far from being an improper linedrawing method, it amounted to a state-initiated device to
solve the sort of problem that the Elections Clause
empowered Congress to fix.
Even if the commission-drawn lines could have been
deemed improper, the rubric would have been understood to
empower Congress to step in. It is hard to see how the state’s
decision to use the initiative process within a rubric that in
large part sought to acknowledge state authority could have
originally meant that a court could condemn the state’s
choice in the absence of Congressional action.
e. Constitutional Construction. As with the Recess
Appointment Clause, absent additional historical evidence,
constitutional construction is unnecessary to resolve how the
Elections Clause should apply to these facts. The original
public meaning embodied in the rubric designed to solve the
problem of ensuring that states elect House members
without trampling state authority encompasses a state’s use
of a legitimate process for exercising the legislative power.
If new evidence emerges suggesting that the meaning of
“legislature” is vague, the Court would need to employ the
tools of constitutional construction to develop a rule
consistent with that meaning. The analysis required would
encompass factors flowing from the Clause’s original public
meaning within the framework of the problem solving rubric.
As an initial matter, a court would consider what
alternatives may have been excluded by the choice of the
term “legislature.” Since the initiative process was largely
unknown in the late eighteenth century, it is extremely
unlikely that the rubric would have meant to exclude it. But
if any viable alternative could have been understood by the
public to be excluded, constitutional construction would need
to account for it.
Another approach within the construction process would
be to examine how Congress responded with respect to its
Elections Clause responsibilities when, in the early
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twentieth century, the initiative process emerged as a
significant tool for exercising state legislative power.190 The
view of a later Congress, of course, could not definitively
establish the 1789 original public meaning. But because the
clause conveyed to Congress the power to redraw a state’s
district lines, any Congress’s view on what sort of linedrawing would be improper is relevant. That, of course, is
exactly what Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion did,
pointing out that Congress in 1911 recognized that the
initiative process would be an acceptable one for drawing
district lines.191
IV. THE SEMANTIC MEANING CRITIQUE
Semantic originalism embodies a core belief that the best
method to interpret the Constitution rests on discovering the
intersubjective, historical fact of an original meaning to
guard against the influx of subjective modern values into the

190. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of
December 2015, twenty-six states and the U.S. Virgin Islands had some form of
initiative process that enabled laws to be enacted without the approval of a
representative legislative body. Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-theinitiative-states.aspx (last visited May 2, 2017).
191. Justice Ginsberg explained that in a 1911 Act addressing redistricting
Congress focused on the fact that several States had supplemented the
representative legislature mode of lawmaking with a direct lawmaking
role for the people, through the processes of initiative (positive
legislation by the electorate) and referendum (approval or disapproval of
legislation by the electorate). 47 Cong. Rec. 3508 (statement of Sen.
Burton)[.] . . . To accommodate that development, the 1911 Act
eliminated the statutory reference to redistricting by the state
“legislature” and instead directed that, if a State’s apportionment of
Representatives increased, the State should use the Act’s default
procedures for redistricting “until such State shall be redistricted in the
manner provided by the laws thereof.” Ch. 5, § 4, 37 Stat. 14 (emphasis
added).
Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2668–70 (A similar 1941 Act also recognized
the legitimacy of redistricting “‘in the manner provided by the law thereof’—as
Arizona did by utilizing the independent commission procedure in its
Constitution . . . .”).
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interpretive
calculus.192
The
founding
generation,
originalists emphasize, “is best understood as the clause
meaning of its provisions . . . that would have been assigned
at the time the Constitution was ratified . . . .”193 Any method
that grants modern interpreters “substantial discretion to
apply constitutional provisions as they see fit” raises a red
flag for many originalists, because this flexibility makes
“it . . . a little difficult to see what is left of a recognizable
originalism.”194 Courts must therefore “focus on the meaning
of specific clauses rather than on the animating principle
that resulted in those more specific clauses being drafted and
ratified.”195
To be sure, one can debate the content of original public
meaning. But that debate, as Whittington recognized, must
rely on “intersubjective standards of evaluation” and “be
supported by the weight of historical evidence.”196 The facts
may not be obvious, but they are facts. When all the
information is in, an objective answer must be determinable
without reference to subjective, inherently contestable
values.197
Farsighted originalism appears to run counter to this
approach. By opening the interpretive method to all potential
original public meanings, the critique runs, the firewall
192. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 195 (Originalist analysis must rest on
“intersubjective standards of evaluation.”).
193. Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 150
(2007).
194. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles
as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 381 (2007).
195. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 37, 195.
196. Id.
197. The recent procedural turn within originalism takes this approach a step
further by narrowing the scope of the construction zone in which value-laden
analysis may creep in. By following the procedural approaches recognized at the
time of the framing, this branch of originalism claims that one can resolve most
instances of vague meaning without entering the construction zone. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 160, at 753 (A focus on “[o]riginal methods
is . . . normatively superior to constructionist originalism.”).
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between discoverable, inter-subjective, historical fact and
inherently contestable subjective value choices becomes too
thin. Like the problematic search for the purpose of a
constitutional clause, the problem-solving rubric embodying
the superposition of original public meaning may temptingly
open cracks for subjective modern values to creep in.198 Only
by honing closely to the historical fact of semantic meaning
does originalism fulfill its true promise of precluding the
subjective values of modern judges from infecting
constitutional interpretation.
The validity of this critique rests on the belief that a
dichotomy exists between, on the one hand, discoverable,
inter-subjectively true objective facts about the world and, on
the other, individuating subjective values that are inherently
contestable. If facts and values can be separated in this way,
then the originalist vision of an interpretive method
grounded on the discovery of the objective fact of semantic
meaning can be achieved.
But if this dichotomy is false, and non-contingent, valuefree historical facts do not exist, then the coherent semantic
meaning that originalists seek can never be found. The
meaning of a constitutional text would be inherently
embodied in a structure of value-laden action. One could not
understand the meaning without understanding the values
motivating the use of the language in a particular way.
An originalist method would remain possible without the
fact-value dichotomy. But that method would have to
acknowledge that values are not entirely subjective. They
can be uncovered and meaningfully debated just as facts can.
Farsighted originalism—by focusing on the superposition of
potential meanings embodied in a problem-solving rubric—
takes this step. Assuming that a coherent, value-free
semantic meaning does not exist, farsighted originalism
seeks to uncover the founders’ value structure by examining
198. Cf. Rappaport, supra note 74, at 1494 (explaining the danger of relying
on a constitutional clause’s purpose as an interpretive tool).
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how that generation’s words were used to resolve particular
intergovernmental conflicts.
Since values are on the table, modern values may
threaten to infect the analysis. But if the fact-value
dichotomy is false, that risk cannot be avoided. And by
revealing the necessity of considering both fact and value, we
may increase the likelihood that courts will interpret the
Constitution with the appropriate degree of respect for
original meaning. This Part shows that semantic originalism
rests on the fact-value dichotomy. Relying principally on
Wittgenstein’s use theory of language, it provides an
alternative account through which meaning is best
uncovered by examining value through application.
A. Farsighted Originalism and Linguistic Meaning
Solum has argued that originalists distinguish the fixed
and inter-subjectively determinable linguistic meaning that
forms the interpretive core of their method from meaning
derived from the text’s value-laden, and thus subjective
consequence, application, purpose, or function.199 A functionindependent semantic meaning, however, may be incomplete
to the extent that it ignores the rubric embodied in the text
that solved the particular problem motivating the framers to
include the clause in the Constitution. If one could divorce
semantics from application, a purely semantic meaning
would be derivable. But it could tell us only the meaning of
words disassociated from how they were to be used.
Originalism claims to provide an interpretation with
sufficient content to resolve real constitutional questions
without looking to the values of the speakers. But if the
original meaning is somehow cut off from how the founding
generation understood it to be applied, that meaning cannot
alone answer real questions about the intra-governmental
regulatory clauses.200 It leaves out the critical step—and
199. See Solum, supra note 31, at 2.
200. In Saul Cornell’s words, “[t]o analyze Gricean sentence meaning
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here’s how members of the public in 1791 would have
understood the manner in which those words would be used
to respond to the particular problem we now face.
Within the philosophy of language, Gerald Graff has
addressed this problem in a more general form. He explained
that knowing a language means more than learning the
semantic meaning of words and the structure of sentences:
“a set of codes” exist separately from the words that enable
speakers to make “inferences about . . . situations or contexts
in which particular words and sentences tend to be used.”201
If we didn’t have the codes, “we would have no way of
inferring any intention and thus no way of deciding what any
utterance meant. Without the codes that enable us to
determine the context, ‘the words on the page’ of a text would
tell us nothing.”202 We possess the codes, in a sense,
“unconsciously” and thus perceive that the words tell us
more than they actually do.203
In the context of interpreting the Constitution’s
elegantly specific clauses mediating intra-governmental
conflicts, one cannot understand the clause’s original public
meaning adequately to interpret it in the context of related
future problems without understanding how that clause
addressed the original problem it was drafted to resolve. A
truly inter-subjective semantic meaning would not be
enough to meaningfully guide future decisions.204 The
historically one would need to look at how patterns of usage correlated with
patterns of intentionality at a given historical moment.” Cornell, supra note 143,
at 734 (emphasis in original).
201. GERALD GRAFF, Determinacy/Indeterminacy, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR
LITERARY STUDY 163, 166 (Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 2d ed.
1995).
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. STEVEN MAILLOUX, Interpretation, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY
121, 133–34 (Frank Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 2d ed. 1995)
(“[I]nterpretive theories are not foundational but rhetorical, establishing no
permanent grounding or guiding principles guaranteeing correct interpretation
but certainly providing much rhetorical substance for interpretive debate. . . . We
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interpreter perceives guidance from that meaning only
because bound up with it are unperceived value-laden
assumptions and suppositions about how meaning applies to
particular problems. To say the focus must be on semantic
and not applicative meaning is either (1) to say nothing—
because the meaning we find can’t answer any real
questions—or (2) to read tacitly a possible applicative
meaning into the semantic meaning.
If the goal is to identify a fixed core of constitutional
meaning that would have been understood by the founding
generation and can guide future decision, something like
farsighted originalism with its explicit focus on value laden
action is more likely to produce an interpretation free of
modern values than a pure semantic originalism driven by
tacitly assumed hidden values.
B. Analogy to One-Step and Two-Step Originalism
The relationship of semantic originalism to farsighted
originalism bears some resemblance to Lawrence Lessig’s
description of one-step and two-step originalism.205 He
pointed out that constitutional meaning for the founding
generation was necessarily bound up with a set of presuppositions.206 If those pre-suppositions have changed, then
the correct question should be what the text would have
meant to the founding generation if it had had modern presuppositions. For example, the Eighth Amendment requires
that fines, but not prison sentences, be proportionate.207 But
in the late eighteenth century, the penitentiary system did
not exist. The founding generation likely pre-supposed that
are always arguing at particular moments in specific places to certain audiences.
Our beliefs and commitments are no less real because they are historical, and the
same holds for our interpretations. If no foundationalist theory will resolve
disagreements over poems or treaties, we must always argue our cases. In fact,
that is all we can ever do.”).
205. See Lessig, supra note 60, at 1184–86, 89.
206. Id. at 1212–15.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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the relevant penal options were fines and the death penalty,
only the former could meaningfully be proportioned.208
But if prison sentences were the standard form of
punishment for a serious crime, as they are now, a
constitution requiring proportional fines would surely have
required the same for prison sentences. Unless an
interpreter engages this second step in determining the
original constitutional meaning, she is virtually certain to
arrive at a meaning that the founding generation would not
have understood had it had modern presuppositions.209 But
some originalist justices have argued for exactly this
dichotomy between fines and prison sentences.210
Farsighted originalism also looks to the context from
which the original public meaning is derived. But the
superposition of potential meanings embodied by the
problem-solving rubrics of the intra-governmental-conflictresolving clauses differs from Lessig’s presuppositions in a
critical way. Where Lessig contended that we need to
attribute modern thinking to the founding generation to
remain faithful to original meaning, farsighted originalism
does not import modern suppositions. Rather, it looks to the
full range of possible meanings for the founding generation
given the suppositions that it had.
Solum critiques Lessig in a way that could be extended
to farsighted originalism. Lessig refers, Solum explains, to
applicative meaning—that can change within originalism—
as opposed to semantic meaning that remains fixed.211 To

208. See Lessig, supra note 60, at 1185–86.
209. Id. at 1264 (“For reasons tied to how meaning changes across contexts,
one-step originalism as a practice must systematically defeat any ideal of fidelity.
Blind to the effect of context on meaning, originalism allows context to change
constitutional meaning.”).
210. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–85 (1991) (applying originalist
reasoning to conclude that the Constitution does not require proportionality in
prison sentences); accord Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31–32 (2003) (Scalia,
J. concurring); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
211. Solum, supra note 31, at 65.
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illustrate, Solum uses an example drawn from Lessig’s
paper: assume that punishment X was not thought to be
cruel when the Eighth Amendment was ratified because it
was believed to be painless. At a later time, we learn that
punishment X inflicts “horrendous” pain.212 Solum contends
that “the applicative meaning of cruel could change while the
linguistic meaning remained the same.”213
Solum then points out that many constructions of a
clause may be consistent with a single vague semantic
meeting, and thus constitutional construction—which
originalism incorporates—adequately deals with Lessig’s
examples.214 Farsighted originalism too focuses on the
function of specific constitutional clauses to understand how
they deal with particular problems. Solum may thus contend
that farsighted originalism is really just a form of
constitutional construction.
C. Originalism and the Fact-Value Problem
Although it is certainly possible that I have
misunderstood Solum’s example about cruel and unusual
punishments, it appears to truncate the definition of
semantic meaning shorter than some originalists would. For
example, originalists, including Solum himself, have
concluded that when the founding generation understands
the text to embody a particular conception, then the original
public meaning is fixed as that conception, even though the
concept embodied in the clause might be broad enough to
include different conceptions.215 If the founding generation
212. Id. at 66.
213. Id. at 65–66.
214. Id. at 66.
215. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that
originalists use expectations to establish original public meaning); WHITTINGTON,
supra note 2, at 184–85 (contending that constitutional meaning is limited to the
conceptions held by the founding generation); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note
194, at 378–79 (only the expectations of the founding generation were actually
adopted); Solum, supra note 31, at 109 (expectations are evidence of meaning).
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understood that the Eighth Amendment permitted
punishment X, that conception would seem to be part of the
fixed semantic meaning of cruel unless modern
understandings could be used to alter the conceptions, which
of course originalism prohibits.216
A likely originalist response would be that interpreters
must distinguish between mistakes of inter-subjective fact
and the evolution of individuating expressions of subjective
value. The former are incorporated within originalism; the
latter are excluded.
In Solum’s hypothesized punishment example, he
presumably assumes that the founding generation made a
mistake of fact about how painful the punishment was. The
founding generation erroneously believed that the
hypothetical form of punishment was not painful. And a
subsequent discovery somehow demonstrated via an intersubjective, value-free method that the founder’s belief was
wrong. The constitutional interpretation could thus change
without the need to evaluate subjective values, and thus the
founding generation’s mistake could be corrected without
originalism.
This analytic process, however, must be distinguished
from assessing whether any particular individual or group
would conclude that the level of pain inflicted by a
punishment justified finding the punishment cruel. But all
punishment incorporates some type of pain, physical or
mental. And whether a punishment falls into the category of
acceptable punishments is not a value-free decision. All
categories that a group uses to describe reality are purposive,
what Mark Kelman describes as “creatures of our own
interests in naming.”217 They reflect our values, and are not
216. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 7; WHITTINGTON, supra
note 2, at 184–85; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 194, at 378–79; Solum,
supra note 31, at 109.
217. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 64 (1987); UNGER,
supra note 67, at 32–33 (“[A] fact becomes what it is for us because of the way we
categorize it.”). If things in the world have intelligible essences that individuals
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objectively discoverable, indisputable facts about the real
world. What we mean by an acceptable level of pain is thus
not separable from the values we hold. The two are bound up
together. We thus can never know as a matter of
indisputable, inter-subjective, historic fact what level of pain
constitutes cruelty. It always embodies our values.
But we can know more about shared values than the
traditional fact-value dichotomy suggests. Solum tacitly
recognizes this in his hypothetical. Despite the value-laden
nature of the question, we are not hopelessly ignorant about
how much pain constitutes an unconstitutionally cruel
punishment. Although some sadists might not agree that
excruciating pain would be unconstitutionally cruel, Solum
concludes—and I agree—that American society would share
the value that any punishment falling into the category we
have named excruciating would be unconstitutional. The
answer cannot be derived without engaging values. But we
can be confident in the result nonetheless.
D. Fact, Value, and Language
Within the philosophy of language, the fissures in the
fact-value dichotomy were implicitly acknowledged by
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his argument that meaning and
action are inseparable. One cannot meaningfully distinguish
between the use of language and the meaning it conveys in a
purely semantic way. As Hanna Pitkin explained,
Wittgenstein “does not seem to permit” a distinction between
meaning, on the one hand, and application or use, on the
other—he “teaches that for most purposes the meaning of a
may comprehend separate from language, objective agreement may be possible.
But the possibility of intelligible essences has been largely rejected in modern
philosophy. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 463–66 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651); DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE
bk. III, at 293–306 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2000) (1888); 1 JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 123–27 (9th ed. 1875). And
even if some intelligible essences exist, a theory like originalism that rests on
language as a means to avoid the problem of subjective values could not directly
access an objective essence.
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word is its use; that if we are conceptually puzzled about its
meaning we should look at its use; that the meaning is
learned from the use, is abstracted from it.”218
At some level, everyone knows that language evolves
from use. But we often act as if the linguistic overlords have
imposed a rulebook on us as a matter historical, intersubjectively determinable fact. It is important to consistently
recur to the reality that societies develop language via valueladen actions. As Roberto Unger put it, “the only measure of
the ‘truth’ of language is its power to advance the ends of the
communities of men who speak it”219 and “the real sovereigns
that stand behind the demiurge are the interests that lead
men to classify things as they do.”220
Solum contends that Wittgenstein’s use-theory of
language poses no threat to semantic originalism because it
is not a theory of semantic meaning.221 Solum explains
correctly that Wittgenstein’s “idea is that the meaning of an
expression is the use to which it is put.”222 But then Solum
adds that “[w]ords are used to accomplish deeds, but the
deeds are not the meaning of the words in the semantic sense
of meaning.”223 He then uses the example that Locke’s
Second Treatise was used as part of a political program, but
that program was not the meaning of Locke’s book.224
Wittgenstein, however, appears to have connected
function and meaning in a more fundamental way. The
“primitive” language game at the beginning of Philosophical
Investigations demonstrated that the use theory directly
countered the idea that “meaning is correlated with the

218. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 174–75 (1972).
219. UNGER, supra note 67, at 32.
220. Id. at 80.
221. Solum, supra note 31, at 113–14.
222. Id. at 113.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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word.”225 Meaning, he contended, was directly tied to action,
explaining that we understand a word by acting “in suchand-such a way”226 and asking “doesn’t the fact that
sentences have the same sense consist in their having the
same use?”227
When my daughter was four, she once responded to my
instruction to sit in her car seat by saying “that’s not fair.” I
asked her, “what does that mean?” She responded, “it’s
something you say when someone tells you to do something
that you don’t want to do.” She learned to use the phrase
“that’s not fair” and from that use a fuller understanding
would gradually emerge. Toward the end of his life,
Wittgenstein wrote that the concepts that a society
recognizes do not rest on how language reflects a real world
that one can observe in an inter-subjective way; on the
contrary, “it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the
language-game.”228
Wittgenstein appears to be attempting to show that
meaning is fundamentally embodied in use and function.
“How words are understood,” he wrote, “is not told by words
alone.”229 And “[i]t might almost be said: ‘[m]eaning moves,
whereas a process stands still.’”230 Semantic meaning and

225. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I, at 2e–3e
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1967).
226. Id. at 4e.
227. Id. at 10e.
228. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY ¶ 204, at 28e (G.E.M. Anscombe &
G.H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) (emphasis
removed).
229. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL ¶ 144, at 26e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H.
von Wright eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1967). Stanley Cavell makes a similar
point: “We can understand what words mean apart from understanding why you
say them; but apart from understanding the point of your saying them we cannot
understand what you mean.” Stanley Cavell, The Claim to Rationality:
Knowledge and the Basis of Morality 258–59 (Apr. 1961) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University) (dissertation available in the Cornell
University Library) (emphasis in original).
230. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 229, ¶ 237, at 44e (emphasis in original).
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the function of a clause, especially one included in a
constitution, may be inseparable. And if that is correct, then
farsighted originalism correctly interprets meaning by
looking to the problem-solving rubric, that is, the way that
the clause was originally used to solve a problem of intragovernmental conflict.
CONCLUSION
Farsighted originalism provides a method for
interpreting the Constitution’s elegant specificities that
effectively accommodates American constitutionalism’s dual
commitments to both a rule of law and on-going selfgovernance. Its central claim is that the founding
generation’s grammar encompassed the notion, as Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, that “words that also are a
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United
States, . . . have called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters.”231
As any form of originalism must, the farsighted approach
acknowledges that the Constitution locks in meaning.232 But
what the intra-government-conflict-resolving clauses locked
in was not idiosyncratic. It was programmatic. Although the
founding generation internalized its specialness, it
understood that its giant was one on whose shoulders future
generations would stand and comprehend a larger—but
consistent—meaning in the Constitution’s words.233
Farsighted
originalism
respects
the
founding
generation’s foresight by extending without contradicting its
231. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
232. The phrase “locks in” is borrowed from the leading originalist scholar
Randy Barnett’s description of the value of writtenness. See BARNETT, supra note
20, at 104.
233. See ROBERT BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY 20 (Floyd Dell & Paul
Jordan-Smith eds., 1927) (1628) (“A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a Giant
may see farther than a Giant himself; I may likely add, alter, and see farther
than my predecessors.”).
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vision to encompass a superposition of potential original
meanings embedded within the problem-solving rubric that
the constitutional text employs. Although farsighted
originalism permits the rubric embodied in the clause to
apply to situations that the founding generation did not
foresee, it does not toss aside the Constitution’s language to
serve modern policy considerations. Rather, farsighted
originalism contends that the problem and the rubric
resolving it are—at least for the Constitution’s specific intragovernmental-conflict-resolving
clauses—essential
to
communicate effectively their full meaning to those who
adopted them. Narrower, less flexible interpretations would
not capture critical aspects of the original public meaning.
Farsighted originalism’s historically-based problemsolving-rubric meaning is thus faithful to the methodological
underpinnings on which originalists claim the method’s
worthiness rests. That is, the meaning the clause held for
those who adopted it constrains future interpretations. The
first American generation did not understand the
constitutional language to embody the single semantic
meaning that it held for them. But neither did it believe that
future generations would be unconstrained by an original
meaning. Employing the superposition of potential original
public meanings allows the Constitution to live within
bounds that the founding generation would have understood
and accepted.
And if that is true, modern notions of good government
may infect constitutional interpretation in a way that
displeases some originalists’ sensibilities about how judicial
review should work. But that infection may be an
unavoidable byproduct of relying on original public meaning
as the touchstone of constitutional interpretation.

